Covered interest parity

Central Bank to the World: Supplying Dollars in the COVID Crisis

In his comments at Jackson Hole last year, then-Bank of England Governor Mark Carney highlighted the continuing dominance of the U.S. dollar: it accounts for one-half of global trade invoicing; two thirds of emerging market external debt, official foreign exchange reserves, and global securities issuance; and nearly 90 percent of (one leg of) foreign exchange transactions.

It also is the basis for the Global Dollar system (see our earlier post). The BIS reports that short-term U.S. dollar liabilities of non-U.S. banks total $15 trillion. Foreign exchange forward contracts and swaps—with a gross notional value of more than $75 trillion—add substantially further to U.S. dollar exposures (see here). And, the U.S. Treasury reports that foreigners hold more than $7 trillion of U.S. Treasury securities. To put these numbers into perspective, total assets of U.S. depository institutions are currently $20 trillion. In other words, the U.S. dollar financial system outside of the United States is larger than the American banking system.

Like it or not, the Federal Reserve is the dollar lender of last resort not just for the United States, but for the entire world. The Fed’s role is not altruistic. Instead, it reflects the near-certainty that, in a world of massive cross-border capital flows, dollar funding shortages anywhere in the world will spill back into the United States through fire sales of dollar assets, a surge in the value of the dollar, increased domestic funding costs, or all three.

The Fed’s extraordinary efforts to counter the COVID-19 crisis include aggressive actions to counter dollar shortages outside the United States. In this post, we explore those actions, including the supply of dollar liquidity swaps to 14 central banks (“friends of the Fed”) and—to limit sales that might disrupt the Treasury market—the introduction of a repo facility to provide dollars to the others. We also note the challenges facing countries outside the small inner circle that do not have immediate access to the Fed’s swap lines….

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Rewriting the textbook: covered interest parity

For decades, textbooks on international economics and finance built a part of their scaffolding on the foundation of a relationship called covered interest parity (CIP). CIP postulates that, in a world of free capital flows, currency-hedged returns on equivalent-risk assets will equalize across countries. For example, the return to investing in a 1-year U.S. Treasury bill will equal the return to purchasing euros, investing the proceeds in a 1-year German Government liability, and purchasing a contract guaranteeing the future euro/dollar exchange rate at which the euros will be converted back to dollars a year later. In practice, the CIP relationship was such a reliable feature of international fixed-income markets that for decades one could think of banks operating a nearly costless CIP machine to perform what many viewed as a riskless arbitrage.

Then, one day, the CIP machine broke down. It first stopped working in the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009, when counterparty and liquidity risks both skyrocketed, raising the possibility of defaults and losses in executing the trades necessary. That is, CIP was not a riskless arbitrage.

As a wave of recent research highlights, the conventional, pre-crisis model of the CIP machine remains impaired even as the counterparty and liquidity risks that characterized the GFC have receded....

 

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