Collateral

Reforming the Federal Home Loan Bank System

We authored this post jointly with our friend and colleague, Lawrence J. White, Robert Kavesh Professor of Economics at the NYU Stern School of Business.

Some government financial institutions strengthen the system; others do not. In the United States, as the lender of last resort (LOLR), the Federal Reserve plays a critical role in stabilizing the financial system. Unfortunately, their LOLR job is made harder by the presence of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system—a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) that acts as a lender of next-to-last resort, keeping failing institutions alive and increasing the ultimate costs of their resolution.

We saw this dangerous pattern clearly over the past year when loans (“advances”) from Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) helped postpone the inevitable regulatory reckoning for Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), Signature Bank, and First Republic Bank (see Cecchetti, Schoenholtz and White, Chapter 9 in Acharya et. al. SVB and Beyond: The Banking Stress of 2023).

From a public policy perspective, FHLB advances have extremely undesirable properties. First, in addition to being overcollateralized, these loans are senior to other claims on the borrowing banks—including those of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve: If the borrower defaults, the FHLB lender has a “super-lien.” Second, there is little timely disclosure about the identity of the borrowers or the amount that they borrow. Third, they are willing to provide speedy, low-cost funding to failing institutions—something we assume private lenders would not do.

In this post, we make specific proposals to scale back the FHLB System’s ability to serve as a lender to stressed banks….

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Central Banks' New Frontier: Interventions in Securities Markets

In his 2016 book The End of Alchemy, our friend and former Bank of England Governor Mervyn King provided a template for financial reform aimed at reducing the frequency and severity of crises. At the time, we were very cautious for two reasons. First, we believed that adoption of King’s framework would vastly increase the influence of central banks on private financial markets, something that could ultimately lead to a misallocation of resources in the economy and to a diminution of the independence of monetary policy that is necessary for securing price stability. Second, we doubted that most central banks had the technical capacity to implement the proposal.

Well, the landscape has changed significantly. During the pandemic, central banks intervened massively in private securities markets and there now appears to be no turning back. In a number of jurisdictions, monetary policymakers broadened the scale and scope of their lending and intervened directly in financial markets, going significantly beyond even their extraordinary actions during the 2007-09 financial crisis. As a result, we likely will be paying the costs that we feared could accompany the implementation of King’s proposal, so we might as well reap the benefits.

In this post, we discuss central banks’ pandemic interventions and the type of infrastructure needed to support them. We then review King’s proposal, highlighting how adopting his approach would make the financial system safer, while radically simplifying the role of regulators and supervisors ….

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TradFi and DeFI: Same Problems, Different Solutions

In our recent primer on Crypto-assets and Decentralized Finance (DeFi), we explained that, so long as crypto-assets remain confined to their own world, they pose little if any threat to the traditional finance (TradFi) system. Yet, some crypto-assets are being used to facilitate transactions, as collateral for loans, as the denomination for mortgages, as a basis for risk-sharing, and as assets in retirement plans. Moreover, many financial and nonfinancial businesses are seeking ways to expand the uses of these new instruments. So, it is easy to imagine how the crypto/DeFi world could infect the traditional financial system, diminishing its ability to support real economic activity.

In this post, we highlight how the key problems facing TradFi (ranging from fraud and abuse to runs, panics, and operational failure) also plague the crypto/DeFi world. We also examine the different ways in which TradFi and crypto/DeFi address these common challenges.

To summarize our conclusions, while the solutions employed in TradFi are often inadequate and incomplete, features such as counterparty identification and centralized verification make them both more complete and more effective than those currently in place in the world of crypto/DeFi. Ironically, addressing the severe deficiencies in the current crypto/DeFi infrastructure may prove difficult without making highly unpopular changes that make it look more like TradFi—like requiring participants to verify their identity (see, for example, Makarov and Schoar and Crenshaw).

This is the second in our series of posts on crypto-assets and DeFi. In the next one, we will examine regulatory approaches to limit the risks posed by crypto/DeFi while supporting the benefits of financial innovation….

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Crypto-assets and Decentralized Finance: A Primer

This week, we saw new heights of turbulence in the tempestuous crypto world. Market capitalization plunged as the loss of confidence in a popular coin—designed to be pegged to the dollar—triggered a run that fueled widespread contagion. At this writing, the estimated value of all crypto assets stands at $1.1 trillion, down nearly 60 percent from the $2.7 trillion peak in early November. What are the broader implications for the crypto world and the traditional financial system? Do we face the prospect of the famously volatile world of crypto-assets and decentralized finance (DeFi) undermining the stability of traditional financial (TradFi) system and the real economy?

So long as all these crypto-assets remain confined to the DeFi world, they pose no threat to TradFi or to economic activity. In practice, the fact that enormous fluctuations in value are met with a global shrug (at least so far) is prima facie evidence that crypto-assets currently are systemically irrelevant.

But will crypto-assets remain so disconnected from TradFi and from real economic activity? Crypto instruments already are escaping the DeFi metaverse in notable ways. These include the use of crypto-assets as a means of payment (see our earlier post on stablecoins), as collateral for loans and mortgages, and as assets in retirement plans. These developments lead us to ask two related questions: First, how will the risks arising from crypto and DeFi evolve? Second, how will regulators deal with them if and when they do?

This post is the first in a series that aims to address these questions. As befits a primer, we start with the basics: characterizing crypto-assets and DeFi. In the process, we define common terms and highlight analogies between DeFi and TradFi (traditional finance). For readers who would like to go deeper, we link to a range of studies that provide useful background information.

In a future post, we will highlight that the problems which frequently arise in TradFi (ranging from fraud and abuse to runs, panics, and operational failure) also appear in DeFi, while the aim of DeFi to avoid any discretionary intervention renders key TradFi corrective tools (such as the court adjudication of incomplete contracts) inoperable. Eventually, we also will post about regulatory approaches that can address the risks posed by DeFi, while supporting responsible financial innovation that lowers transaction costs and broadens consumer choice….

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Central Banks and Climate Policy

Avoiding a climate catastrophe requires an urgent global effort on the part of households, firms and governments to reduce our reliance on fossil fuels. Like many economists, we support a carbon tax. We also favor generous fiscal support for R&D to substitute for fossil fuels and remove carbon from the atmosphere.

What role should central banks play in this global effort? That is the prime focus of this post. We argue that central banks must preserve the independence needed for effective monetary policy. That implies only a modest role in addressing climate change.

Central banks are involved in both financial regulation and monetary policy. In each case, there are some things that central bankers can and should do to help counter the threat posed by climate change. As financial regulators, they should implement an improved disclosure regime and develop tools to ensure the financial system is resilient to climate risks.

In conducting monetary policy, central bankers should follow a simple, powerful principle: do not influence relative prices. To be sure, it is and should be standard practice to use interest rates to influence relative prices between consumption today and tomorrow. However, central banks ought not influence relative prices among contemporaneous activities. We will see that achieving this form of relative price neutrality may require central bankers to shift the composition of their assets and to alter the treatment of collateral in their lending operations….

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GameStop: Some Preliminary Lessons

Volatility in the stock market is not new. But, even if one takes a broad perspective, the recent experience with GameStop is extraordinary. As we write, the story is far from over, with several U.S. stocks—like GameStop, AMC Entertainment and Express—still on something of a wild ride. The Securities and Exchange Commission seems poised to investigate. And, members of Congress are planning to hold hearings. We don’t have any particular insights into how or when this will end. That is, except to say that history teaches us that episodes like this typically end badly.

Since this is an unusual post, we begin with a very clear disclaimer: nothing in this blog should be construed either as investment advice or legal advice.

In our view, we can already draw three big lessons from the equity market events of the past week. The first is about how narratives and the limits to arbitrage can lead to unsustainable asset price booms. Second, short sellers are important for the efficiency of asset pricing and the allocation of capital. Moreover, with the ongoing rise of passive index investing, their potential role in keeping the U.S. equity market efficient will become more, not less, salient. Third, to keep the financial system safe and resilient, it is essential that clearing firms maintain sufficiently stringent margin and collateral requirements even if, on occasion, it limits a broker’s ability to implement trades for its clients….

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Making the Treasury Market Resilient

Ensuring financial stability requires resilient institutions. That is why regulators around the world have strengthened capital and liquidity requirements for the largest financial intermediaries since financial crisis of 2007-09.

Making financial markets resilient is equally important. Repeated and sustained bouts of illiquidity and dysfunctionality in a key market can threaten the well-being of even the healthiest institutions.

In a global financial system that runs on dollars, the most important financial market is the one for U.S. Treasury securities. Yet, despite its importance and general reliability, the Treasury market occasionally suffers from serious disruptions. The strains in the Treasury market during the first half of March 2020 became an important motivation for the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented anti-COVID policy actions beginning that month (see here, here and here).

In the remainder of this post, we describe the COVID-induced troubles in the Treasury market and highlight Duffie’s compelling proposal to consider requiring central clearing of U.S. Treasuries. We endorse Duffie’s call to study such a mandate, and view this is as an important element of a broader effort to modernize and reinforce the financial infrastructure….

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Fed's big stick lets it speak powerfully

The powerful stabilizing impact of the Federal Reserve’s COVID response is visible virtually across U.S. financial markets. What is most remarkable about this is how little the Fed has done to achieve these outcomes. To be sure, the central bank now holds $7 trillion in assets, an increase of $2.8 trillion since early March. Yet, virtually all the increase reflects large-scale purchases of government-guaranteed instruments. What we find astonishing is that the acquisition of risky nonfinancial debt remains tiny.

The point is clear: backed by massive fiscal support, the Fed’s mere announcement of its willingness to purchase corporate and municipal bonds, as well as asset-backed securities, has proven sufficient to stabilize markets despite the worst economic shock since WWII. Put differently, the Fed’s willingness to backstop markets has obviated the need to serve actively as a market maker of last resort.

In this post, we document these developments and then speculate about their implications. For one thing, in a future crisis where the U.S. fiscal and monetary authorities share key goals, people will now anticipate that the central bank will backstop financial markets. Because a central bank is almost certain to intervene when systemic risks rise, these stabilizing powers are welcome.

At the same time, the central bank’s backstop is a source of potentially serious moral hazard. We suspect that investors are now counting on Fed stimulus to support equity and bond prices (and possibly bank loans) even as household and business insolvencies rise. Yet, in a market economy, it is shareholders and creditors who ultimately must bear these losses. Indeed, were the U.S. equity market to plunge by 40 percent in the remainder of 2020, that by itself would pose little threat to the financial system, and ought not trigger large corporate bond (let alone equity) purchases by the central bank….

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Central Bank to the World: Supplying Dollars in the COVID Crisis

In his comments at Jackson Hole last year, then-Bank of England Governor Mark Carney highlighted the continuing dominance of the U.S. dollar: it accounts for one-half of global trade invoicing; two thirds of emerging market external debt, official foreign exchange reserves, and global securities issuance; and nearly 90 percent of (one leg of) foreign exchange transactions.

It also is the basis for the Global Dollar system (see our earlier post). The BIS reports that short-term U.S. dollar liabilities of non-U.S. banks total $15 trillion. Foreign exchange forward contracts and swaps—with a gross notional value of more than $75 trillion—add substantially further to U.S. dollar exposures (see here). And, the U.S. Treasury reports that foreigners hold more than $7 trillion of U.S. Treasury securities. To put these numbers into perspective, total assets of U.S. depository institutions are currently $20 trillion. In other words, the U.S. dollar financial system outside of the United States is larger than the American banking system.

Like it or not, the Federal Reserve is the dollar lender of last resort not just for the United States, but for the entire world. The Fed’s role is not altruistic. Instead, it reflects the near-certainty that, in a world of massive cross-border capital flows, dollar funding shortages anywhere in the world will spill back into the United States through fire sales of dollar assets, a surge in the value of the dollar, increased domestic funding costs, or all three.

The Fed’s extraordinary efforts to counter the COVID-19 crisis include aggressive actions to counter dollar shortages outside the United States. In this post, we explore those actions, including the supply of dollar liquidity swaps to 14 central banks (“friends of the Fed”) and—to limit sales that might disrupt the Treasury market—the introduction of a repo facility to provide dollars to the others. We also note the challenges facing countries outside the small inner circle that do not have immediate access to the Fed’s swap lines….

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Has P2P lending already hit the wall?

The two biggest U.S. P2P lenders, Prosper and Lending Club, started operations in 2005 and 2007, respectively. Over the past decade, their business has grown so that they now originate more than $10 billion in loans per year. The public information provided by Lending Club gives us an opportunity to judge how they are doing. At first, P2P lending returns appear remarkably high (adjusted for volatility), but growing evidence of adverse selection highlights how difficult it will be to sustain growth.

When we last wrote about P2P lending, we suggested that profitability might be a consequence of the booming economy (see here and here). We concluded that one would need to see performance in a recession before judging P2P’s long-run potential. That is, when you are making consumer loans, it is relatively easy to make money as the unemployment rate falls from 10% to 3.5%. However, profitability over the course of an entire business cycle, including periods when joblessness is rising, is an entirely different story.

Well, maybe there is no need to wait….

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