Pro-cyclical

Thoughts on Deposit Insurance

Government guarantees have become the norm in the financial system. According to the latest Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (2017) estimate, the U.S. government’s safety net covers 60% of private financial liabilities in the United States. Serious underpricing of government guarantees gives intermediaries the incentive to take risk that can threaten the entire financial system: the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-09 is the most obvious case in point.

Deposit insurance is arguably the oldest and most widespread form of government guarantee in finance. In the United States, Congress established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) at the depth of the Great Depression in 1933 to help prevent bank runs. Today, more than 140 countries have some type of deposit insurance scheme.

In this post, we briefly review the evolution of FDIC deposit insurance pricing. We highlight evidence that, largely because of Congressional mandates, the federal insurance guarantee was underpriced for many years. It is not until 2011, following the crisis of 2007-09, that the FDIC introduced the current framework for risk-based deposit insurance fees, bringing insurance premia closer to what observers would deem to be actuarially fair.

Going forward, as with any insurance regime, keeping up with the evolution of bank (and broader financial system) risks will require a willingness to update the deposit insurance pricing framework from time to time. That means adjusting pricing to reflect both the range of bank risk-taking at a point in time and—to ensure the sustainability of the deposit insurance fund without taxpayer subsidies—the evolution of aggregate risk….

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Fiscal Space Has Limits, Too

In the battle against the economic impact of COVID-19, governments around the world are pulling out all the stops. In advanced economies, leading central banks have pushed interest rates to zero or below. And, a recent IMF estimate puts the combination of discretionary spending and automatic fiscal stabilizers (including unemployment insurance and progressive income taxation) at $9 trillion―more than 10 percent of global GDP.

With bond yields low or negative, the limits to monetary policy are clear (see our pre-COVID post). How large is the scope for additional countercyclical fiscal policy? With sovereign yields so low, the cost of additional financial expansion looks to be minimal, at least for now (see, for example, Blanchard).

Nevertheless, each time public debt-to-GDP ratios ratchet higher—as they did in the 2007-09 crisis and are now doing again—the question of “fiscal space” reemerges. When the next economic shock hits, will governments again be able to provide relief and stimulus on the scale required to meet society’s needs?

In this post, we highlight recent fiscal developments in advanced economies, and review the factors affecting the sustainability of their high and rising levels of debt. To foreshadow our conclusion, the fact that many countries’ fiscal positions were precarious even before the COVID crisis does not weaken the current case for stimulus. But, doubts about fiscal space are growing. So, it is important that governments find a way to make a credible commitment to future fiscal consolidation when their economies have returned to full employment. Failure to do so could threaten confidence both in government finances and in economic performance….

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The Case for Strengthening Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers

For decades, monetary economists viewed central banks as the “last movers.” They were relatively nimble in their ability to adjust policy to stabilize the economy as signs of a slowdown arose. In contrast, discretionary fiscal policy is difficult to implement quickly. In addition, allowing for the possibility of a constantly changing fiscal stance adds to uncertainty and raises the risk that short-run politics, rather than effective use of public resources, will drive policy. So, the ideal fiscal approach was to set policy to support long-run priorities, minimizing short-run discretionary changes that can reduce economic efficiency.

Today, because conventional monetary policy has little room to ease, the case for using fiscal policy as a cyclical stabilizer is far stronger. Unless something changes, there is a good chance that when the next recession hits, monetary policymakers will once again find themselves stuck for an extended period at the lower bound for policy rates. In the absence of a monetary policy offset, fiscal policy is likely to be significantly more effective.

Against this background, a new book from The Hamilton Project and the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, Recession Ready: Fiscal Policies to Stabilize the American Economy, makes a compelling case for strengthening automatic fiscal stabilizers. These are the tax, transfer and spending components that change with economic conditions, as the law prescribes….

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Trump v. Fed

Last month, interrupting decades of presidential self-restraint, President Trump openly criticized the Federal Reserve. Given the President’s penchant for dismissing valuable institutions, it is hard to be surprised. Perhaps more surprising is the high quality of his appointments to the Board of Governors. Against that background, the limited financial market reaction to the President’s comments suggests that investors are reasonably focused on the selection of qualified academics and individuals with valuable policy and business experience, rather than a few early-morning words of reproof.

Nevertheless, the President’s comments are seriously disturbing and—were they to become routine—risk undermining the significant benefits that Federal Reserve independence brings. Importantly, the criticism occurred despite sustained strength in the economy and financial markets, and despite the stimulative monetary and fiscal policies in place….

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