Moral hazard

SEC Money Market Fund Reform Proposals Fall Far Short, Again

As the principal regulator of U.S. money market mutual funds (MMMFs), the SEC has a duty to end the market distortions and moral hazard that repeated public rescues create. There have been two MMMF bailouts, so far. The first came at the height of the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, while the second followed in the March 2020 COVID crisis. While the Treasury provided guarantees only once, the Federal Reserve offered emergency liquidity assistance both times.

These repeated government interventions encourage MMMF managers to behave in ways that make future liquidity crises more likely. Moreover, there is no credible way for the Fed to promise not to intervene should a systemic disruption again loom in short-term funding markets. The only realistic means to end the subsidies created by the implicit promise of future bailouts is to force MMMFs to be far more resilient than they are today.

Against this background, the SEC’s December 2021 MMMF reform proposals are seriously disappointing. In this post, we start with basic facts about the scale and mix of MMMFs today. We then describe the SEC’s proposals, before focusing on their key shortcomings. We hope that the public comments that the SEC receives will motivate it, at the very least, to conduct a serious quantitative assessment of introducing capital requirements for the most vulnerable MMMFs, to re-assess the scale of additional liquid assets needed for MMMF resilience in the absence of a Fed backstop, and to propose ways to enhance the effectiveness and utility of MMMF stress tests….

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The Urgent Agenda for Financial Reform

Thanks to unprecedented interventions by central banks and fiscal authorities, the pandemic-induced financial strains of March-April 2020 are now well behind us. Unfortunately, as a consequence of the official actions necessary to stabilize the financial system, market participants now count on government backstops to insure them against the fallout from future disturbances.

Naturally, central banks should be prepared to combat extreme shocks that threaten financial stability. However, to limit excessive reliance on central banks, we need to ensure that financial institutions can continue to operate smoothly on their own even in bad times. This means redesigning parts of the financial architecture. While market participants have a major role to play, it is authorities who need to address externalities—spillover effects—and to improve incentives for the private sector to maintain the liquidity of markets and access to short-term funding in times of moderate stress.

With the pandemic-induced disruptions still fresh in memory, this is the perfect time to identify deficiencies and implement reforms aimed at improving the resilience of the financial system. Fortunately, the June 2021 Report of the Hutchins Center-Chicago Booth Task Force on Financial Stability (H-B) addresses all the key challenges, laying out a broad agenda for U.S. financial reform. In addition, we have the July 2021 G-30 Report that provides detailed proposals for reforming the U.S. Treasury market.

In this post, we discuss these reform proposals, highlighting areas where we strongly agree and believe that implementation is urgent. In particular, we emphasize the benefits that would come from changes in the Treasury market (cash and repo), in the central counterparties (CCPs) that have become the most critical links in the global financial system, and in open-end mutual funds holding illiquid assets. We also highlight the governance proposals in the H-B Report. In our view, full implementation of the agendas set out in the these reports would make the U.S. financial system far safer than it is today….

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Thoughts on Deposit Insurance

Government guarantees have become the norm in the financial system. According to the latest Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (2017) estimate, the U.S. government’s safety net covers 60% of private financial liabilities in the United States. Serious underpricing of government guarantees gives intermediaries the incentive to take risk that can threaten the entire financial system: the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-09 is the most obvious case in point.

Deposit insurance is arguably the oldest and most widespread form of government guarantee in finance. In the United States, Congress established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) at the depth of the Great Depression in 1933 to help prevent bank runs. Today, more than 140 countries have some type of deposit insurance scheme.

In this post, we briefly review the evolution of FDIC deposit insurance pricing. We highlight evidence that, largely because of Congressional mandates, the federal insurance guarantee was underpriced for many years. It is not until 2011, following the crisis of 2007-09, that the FDIC introduced the current framework for risk-based deposit insurance fees, bringing insurance premia closer to what observers would deem to be actuarially fair.

Going forward, as with any insurance regime, keeping up with the evolution of bank (and broader financial system) risks will require a willingness to update the deposit insurance pricing framework from time to time. That means adjusting pricing to reflect both the range of bank risk-taking at a point in time and—to ensure the sustainability of the deposit insurance fund without taxpayer subsidies—the evolution of aggregate risk….

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Big Tech, Fintech, and the Future of Credit

Lenders want to know that borrowers will pay them back. That means assessing creditworthiness before making a loan and then monitoring borrowers to ensure timely payment in full. Lenders have three principal tools for raising the likelihood of that firms will repay. First, they look for borrowers with a sufficiently large personal stake in their enterprise. Second, they look for firms with collateral that lenders can seize in the event of a default. Third, they obtain information on the firm’s current balance sheet, its historical revenue and profits, experience with past loans, and the like.

Unfortunately, this conventional approach to overcoming the challenges of asymmetric information is less effective for new firms that have both very short credit histories and very little in the way of physical collateral. As a result, these potential borrowers have trouble obtaining funds through standard channels. This is one reason that governments subsidize small business lending, and why entrepreneurs are forced to pledge their homes as collateral.

Well, new solutions have emerged to overcome this old problem. In this post we discuss how technology is increasing small firms’ access to credit. By using massive amounts of data to improve credit assessments, as well as real-time information and platform advantages to enforce repayment terms, technology companies appear to be doing what traditional lenders have not: making loans to millions of small businesses at attractive rates and experiencing remarkably low default rates.

The biggest advances are in places where financial systems are not meeting social needs….

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An Economic Zombie Survival Guide

Everyone surely hopes that zombies will remain confined to the growing list of horror movies. But unless we shut them down, insolvent firms can become economic zombies that suffocate innovation and growth.

As the COVID pandemic continues, policymakers will face some difficult decisions. Many businesses are coming under increasingly severe financial stress. Some, like dry-cleaning establishments that rely on laundering clothing for office workers, have limited prospects even after the pandemic subsides. But there are others that have a bright post-COVID future if they can hold on long enough. Without a way to distinguish these two groups, we face an unpleasant choice of either creating zombies or allowing viable firms to perish.

In our view, the solution to this problem is to reinforce and modify the bankruptcy process. This means ensuring that there are sufficient resources to restructure the debts of those whose expected future profits exceed their liquidation value, while allowing the remainder to close. In the case of large corporations, we can make use of Chapter 11. For smaller firms, if it is not already too late, we need a low-cost mechanism more tailored to their needs.

In the remainder of this post, we discuss these two related issues: zombie firms and the use of bankruptcy procedures to identify and sustain viable firms.

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Fed's big stick lets it speak powerfully

The powerful stabilizing impact of the Federal Reserve’s COVID response is visible virtually across U.S. financial markets. What is most remarkable about this is how little the Fed has done to achieve these outcomes. To be sure, the central bank now holds $7 trillion in assets, an increase of $2.8 trillion since early March. Yet, virtually all the increase reflects large-scale purchases of government-guaranteed instruments. What we find astonishing is that the acquisition of risky nonfinancial debt remains tiny.

The point is clear: backed by massive fiscal support, the Fed’s mere announcement of its willingness to purchase corporate and municipal bonds, as well as asset-backed securities, has proven sufficient to stabilize markets despite the worst economic shock since WWII. Put differently, the Fed’s willingness to backstop markets has obviated the need to serve actively as a market maker of last resort.

In this post, we document these developments and then speculate about their implications. For one thing, in a future crisis where the U.S. fiscal and monetary authorities share key goals, people will now anticipate that the central bank will backstop financial markets. Because a central bank is almost certain to intervene when systemic risks rise, these stabilizing powers are welcome.

At the same time, the central bank’s backstop is a source of potentially serious moral hazard. We suspect that investors are now counting on Fed stimulus to support equity and bond prices (and possibly bank loans) even as household and business insolvencies rise. Yet, in a market economy, it is shareholders and creditors who ultimately must bear these losses. Indeed, were the U.S. equity market to plunge by 40 percent in the remainder of 2020, that by itself would pose little threat to the financial system, and ought not trigger large corporate bond (let alone equity) purchases by the central bank….

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Bank Runs and Panics: A Primer

A bank promises its clients immediate access to cash. Depositors can redeem their funds on demand at face value—first come, first served. Other short-term creditors can do the same, albeit at varying speeds, by not rolling over their loans. And, households and firms that pay a fee for a credit commitment can take down their loans at will.

For banks that hold illiquid assets, these promises of liquidity on demand are the key source of vulnerability. The same applies to other financial institutions (de facto or shadow banks) that perform bank-like services, using their balance sheets to transform illiquid, longer-maturity, risky assets into liquid, short-maturity, low-risk liabilities.

A bank run occurs when depositors wish to make a large volume of withdrawals all at once. A bank that cannot meet this sudden demand fails. Even solvent banks—those whose assets exceed the value of their liabilities—fail if they cannot convert their assets into cash rapidly enough (and with minimal loss) to satisfy their clients’ demands. A banking panic is the plural of a bank run: when clients run on multiple banks. We call the spread of runs from one bank to others contagion—the same term used to describe the spread of a biological pathogen.

In this primer, we characterize the sources of bank runs and panics, as well as the tools we use to prevent or mitigate them….

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FEMA for Finance

Modern financial systems are inherently vulnerable. The conversion of savings into investment—a basic function of finance—involves substantial risk. Creditors often demand liquid, short-term, low-risk assets; and borrowers typically wish to finance projects that take time to generate their uncertain returns. Intermediaries that bridge this gap—transforming liquidity, maturity and credit between their assets and liabilities—are subject to runs should risk-averse savers come to doubt the market value of their assets.

The modern financial system is vulnerable in a myriad of other ways as well. For example, if hackers were to suddenly render a key identification technology untrustworthy, it could disable the payments system, bringing a broad swath of economic activity to an abrupt halt. Similarly, the financial infrastructure that implements most transactions—ranging from retail payments to the clearing and settlement of securities and derivatives trades—typically relies on a few enormous hubs that are irreplaceable in the short run. Economies of scale and scope mean that such financial market utilities (FMUs) make transactions cheap, but they also concentrate risk: even their temporary disruption could be catastrophic. (One of our worst nightmares is a cyber-attack that disables the computer and power grid on which our financial system and economy are built.)

With these concerns in mind, we welcome our friend Kathryn Judge’s innovative proposal for a financial “Guarantor of Last Resort”—or emergency guarantee authority (EGA)—as a mechanism for containing financial crises. In this post, we discuss the promise and the pitfalls of Judge’s proposal. Our conclusion is that an EGA would be an excellent tool for managing the fallout from dire threats originating outside the financial system—cyber-terrorism or outright war come to mind. In such circumstances, we see an EGA as a complement to existing conventional efforts at enhancing financial system resilience.

However, the potential for the industry to game an EGA, as well as the very real possibility that politicians will see it as a substitute for rigorous capital and liquidity requirements, make us cautious about its broader applicability. At least initially, this leads us to conclude that the bar for invoking an EGA should be set very high—higher than Judge suggests….

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Sources of Finance: Internal versus External

It ought not be surprising that borrowing can be difficult. In good times, households usually can obtain financing to purchase a house or car. But these loans are secured with collateral that is easy to resell. Even so, some measures suggest that it is currently more difficult than under “normal” conditions to obtain mortgage finance (see the Urban Institute’s Housing Credit Availability Index on page 16).

With firms, credit has been rising significantly in recent years—across advanced and emerging economies alike (see the BIS measures through 2017 here). Yet, commercial borrowers, especially small and medium sized enterprises, complain loudly when they feel that their ability to succeed is being hampered by overly cautious lenders. And, since lenders often find it difficult to both assess a business’s prospects and to monitor effort once a loan is made, aside from periods of euphoria borrowing can be quite difficult.

As we discuss in our primers on adverse selection and moral hazard, information asymmetries make external funding—either through equity or debt—expensive. And, while the entire financial system is designed to reduce these costs, they are still quite high….

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Banks and Money, Or Watch out What You Wish For

On 10 June 2008, a large majority of voters in Switzerland rejected a proposal that all commercial bank demand deposits be held at the central bank. This Vollgeld referendum was another incarnation of the justifiable public revulsion to financial crises and the bailouts that inevitably accompany them. Vollgeld proponents claimed that a system in which the central bank is the sole issuer of “money” will be more stable.

Serious people debated the wisdom of this proposal. One of Switzerland’s premier monetary economists, Philippe Bacchetta, wrote passionately in opposition. Martin Wolf, chief economics commentator at the Financial Times, argued in favor. And Swiss National Bank Chairman Thomas Jordan discussed the many dangers in detail.

It should come as no surprise that, had we had been among the Swiss voters, we would have voted “no.” In our view, the Vollgeld (sovereign money) initiative combined aspects of narrow banking with those of retail central bank digital currency. We see these as misguided, distorting the credit allocation mechanism and more likely to reduce than improve financial stability (see here and here). In the remainder of this post, we explain why….

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