Commentary

Commentary

 
 
How securitization really works
In the winter of 1997, musician David Bowie issued $55 million worth of bonds backed by royalty revenue from 287 songs he had written and recorded before 1990. The bonds had a 10-year maturity, a Moody’s A3 rating, and a 7.9% interest rate (at the time, the 10-year Treasury yield was around 6.5%, so the spread was relatively modest). “Bowie bonds” were no accident: by the late 1990s, the U.S. financial system had evolved to the point where virtually any payment stream could be securitized.

The success of U.S. securitization – as an alternative to bank finance – is a key factor behind the current push of euro-area authorities to increase securitization...
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Reverse Repo Risks
Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the Federal Reserve has stabilized the financial system and put the economy back on a path to sustainable growth. This task involved creating a colossal balance sheet, which now stands at $4.37 trillion, more than four times the pre-Lehman level ($940 billion). As textbooks (like ours) teach, along with this increase in Fed assets has come an increase in reserve liabilities (which represent deposits by banks at the Fed). Today, banks’ excess reserves (that is, the extra reserves beyond those that banks must hold at the Fed) are at $2.56 trillion, compared to virtually zero prior to the crisis.

Getting the money and banking system back to normal requires doing something to manage these excess reserves ...
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Growth and dynamism: troubling facts

When the U.S. economy was booming in the 1990s, new firms flourished and willing workers found jobs quickly. In the current decade, these patterns faded. Startup and job finding rates have slowed so that employment has only just surpassed its 2007 peak. While part of current U.S. frailty remains cyclical, these trends suggest a worrying loss of economic dynamism...

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Monetary policy target regimes: inflation, price level, nominal GDP, etc.
Should central banks target inflation, the price level or nominal GDP? The question of the appropriate policy target has been a subject of analysis at least since the 1980s and has become a matter of intense debate (see here and here) for the past several years. Many proponents of price-level or nominal GDP targeting share the idea that – by credibly committing to make up the shortfalls in the price level or in nominal GDP relative to the pre-crisis trend – policymakers could drive down the current real interest rate and accelerate the economic recovery.

Looking at where we are today, what would this mean?
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Time-varying Capital Requirements: Rules vs. Discretion (again)
Among its numerous, innovations Basel III proposes that national authorities use countercyclical capital buffers to temper booms in credit growth and asset prices. [...]

Will it work? Is such a system either practical or desirable? Our view is that regardless of how theoretically attractive, making such time-varying capital regulation discretionary is unlikely to work in practice. Rules would serve us all much better.
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Update on Target2 Balances: Limited progress
Observers of the euro-area financial crisis typically focus on the yield spreads on peripheral government long-term bonds (compared to German yields) as the “fever thermometer” of the crisis. On that basis (see chart below), the crisis looks like it is over: after peaking in 2012, spreads rapidly receded following European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi’s promise to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. Indeed, in Ireland, Italy, and Spain, yields themselves have now sunk to the lowest levels since the euro was created in 1999...
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Bubble, Bubble, Toil and Trouble: What's a policymaker to do?
With key central bank policy rates stuck at the zero bound (or below!), investors in Europe, Japan, and the United States are searching for yield under every rock (see, for example, the charts below on S&P500 prices and earnings). That is, they are willing to accept small gains on their investments because they see little risk that their cost of funding will rise significantly for a long time...
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The SEC is in the Wrong Business
A recent open letter from an SEC Commissioner reminded us of several absurdities of the U.S. financial regulatory apparatus. The Commissioner railed against the Treasury Office of Financial Research (OFR) report on Asset Management and Financial Stability. At the request of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), the OFR sought to analyze activities in the asset management industry that could pose risks to the broader financial system...
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Are Big Asset Managers Systemic?
The Financial System Oversight Council (FSOC) is considering whether any asset managers should be designated as systemically important financial intermediaries (SIFIs), making them subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve. In the same vein, the Financial Stability Board recently proposed a framework for determining whether an asset manager is a global SIFI.

The question itself is highly controversial...
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Trade repositories: Still far from the "risk map" we need
Among the many reforms in the aftermath of the financial crisis is the agreement among international regulators that all over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives contracts should be reported to trade repositories. The goal is to help market participants and regulators gain a better understanding of the extent and distribution of risk taking in financial markets. G-20 leaders committed to this and other improvements to financial market infrastructure (we described the move to central clearing parties (CCPs) in earlier posts). But, unlike the shift to CCPs, trade repositories seem very unlikely to meet officials’ lofty aspirations in the next few years...
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