Capital requirements

Making Banking Safe

The regulatory reforms that followed the financial crisis of 2007-09 created a financial system that is far more resilient than the one we had 15 years ago. Today, banks and some nonbanks face more rigorous capital and liquidity requirements. Improved collateral rules for market-making activities can dampen shocks. And, some institutions are subject to well-structured resolution regimes.

Yet, the events of March 2023 make clear that the system remains fragile. The progress thus far is simply not enough. What else needs to be done?

In a new essay, we address this critical question. Our assessment of the banking system turmoil of 2023 leads us to several obvious conclusions, some of which clearly escaped both bank managers and their supervisors. Perhaps the simplest and most significant is that banks can survive either risky assets or volatile funding, but not both. Another is that supervisors are willing to treat some banks as systemic in death, but not in life.

We also draw two compelling lessons from the recent supervisory and resolution debacles. First, a financial system which relies heavily on supervisory discretion is unlikely to prove resilient. Second, authorities with emergency powers to bail out intermediaries during a panic will always do so. That is, policymakers are incapable of making credible commitments to impose losses on depositors and others. In our view, the only way to address this commitment problem is to prevent crises….

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The Future of Deposit Insurance

This post is authored jointly with our friend and colleague, Thomas Philippon, Max L. Heine Professor of Finance at the NYU Stern School of Business

Deposit insurance is a key regulatory tool for limiting bank runs and panics. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has insured bank deposits since 1934. FDIC-insured deposits are protected by a credible government guarantee, so there is little incentive to run.

However, deposit insurance creates moral hazard. By eliminating the incentive of depositors to monitor their banks, it encourages bank managers to rely on low-cost insured deposits to fund risky activities. In the extreme, with 100% deposit insurance coverage, banks would have virtually no incentive to issue equity or debt.

Against this background, and in light of the events of March-April 2023, we ask what is to be done about deposit insurance. To prevent bank runs, should there be an increase in the legal limit? If so, how can authorities balance the costs of runs and panics against the costs associated with moral hazard, while keeping in mind the potential financial burden on the public? Or, are there alternatives?

We emphasize three promising ways to enhance deposit insurance: a higher insurance cap for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), new resolution rules, and the option to purchase supplementary deposit insurance. In addition, and as regular readers of this blog might expect, we also think that higher capital requirements should be part of the solution: if we require that banks increase the degree to which they finance their assets with capital (rather than deposits), the risk of runs and panics would decline even without raising the cap on deposit insurance….

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The Extraordinary Failures Exposed by Silicon Valley Bank's Collapse

The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) revealed an extraordinary range of astonishing failures. There was the failure of the bank’s executives to manage the maturity and liquidity risks that are basic to the business of banking: they failed Money and Banking 101. There was the failure of market discipline by investors who either didn’t notice or didn’t care about the fact that the bank was severely undercapitalized for the better part of a year before it collapsed. There was the failure of the supervisors to compel the bank to manage the simplest and most obvious risks. And, there was the failure of the resolution authorities to act in mid-2022 when SVB’s true net worth had sunk far below the minimum threshold for “prompt corrective action.”

Waiting several quarters to act deepened the threat to the financial system, undermining confidence not only in many other banks but also in the competence of the supervisors. The extraordinary rescue actions last week by both the deposit insurer (FDIC) and the lender of last resort (Federal Reserve) are just a sign of the high costs associated with restoring financial stability when confidence plunges.

In this post we discuss each of these four failures, as well as the actions that authorities took to stabilize the financial system following the SVB failure. To anticipate our conclusions, we see an urgent need for officials to do at least five things:

  • First, to regain credibility, supervisors need to do an immediate review of the unrealized losses on the balance sheets of all 45 banks with assets in excess of $50 billion.

  • Second, they should perform a speedy and focused stress test on each of these banks to assess the  impact on their true net worth of a sizable further increase in interest rates. Any bank with a capital shortfall should be compelled either to issue new equity or shut down. (To ensure the availability of the necessary resources, authorities will need to have a pool of public funds available to recapitalize banks that cannot attract private investors.)

  • Third, to restore resilience, Congress must reverse the 2018-19 weakening of regulation that allowed medium-size banks to escape rigorous capital and liquidity requirements.

  • Fourth, the authorities must change accounting rules to ensure that reported capital more accurately reflects each bank’s true financial condition.

  • Finally, policymakers should assess the impact on the financial system and on the federal debt arising from the now-implicit promise to insure all deposits in a crisis. To limit risk taking, correspondingly greater fees and higher capital and liquidity requirements should accompany any explicit increase in the cap on deposit insurance.

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Comments on Fed CBDC Paper

Last month, the Federal Reserve issued a long-awaited discussion paper on the possibility of introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) for retail use. The Fed paper calls for comments on the benefits and risk of introducing a U.S. CBDC, as well as on its optimal design. In this post, we respond to each of the 22 questions posed in the discussion paper. For the most part, these responses are based on our previous analyses of CBDC (here and here).

At the outset, we highlight our doubt that the benefits of a U.S. CBDC will exceed the risks. In our view, other, less risky, means are available to achieve all the key benefits that CBDC advocates anticipate. Moreover, we are not aware of sustainable design features that would reduce the risks of financial instability that many analysts agree will accompany the introduction of a digital U.S. dollar.

However, this overall judgment regarding a CBDC’s benefits and risks is sensitive to two considerations that appear in the Fed’s analysis either explicitly or implicitly. First, CBDC may be a less risky alternative to stablecoins, should regulation of the latter prove politically infeasible (see our earlier post). Second, if other highly trustworthy financial jurisdictions (with convertible currencies, credible property rights protections, and free cross-border flow of capital) offer their own CBDC, the case for a U.S. CBDC—as a device to sustain widespread use of the dollar—would become stronger.

Against this background, we applaud the Fed’s conservative approach. Most important, the U.S. authorities are not rushing to act. Instead, they are thinking carefully about the design elements, are actively engaged in public outreach, and have committed not to proceed without first securing broad public support….

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SEC Money Market Fund Reform Proposals Fall Far Short, Again

As the principal regulator of U.S. money market mutual funds (MMMFs), the SEC has a duty to end the market distortions and moral hazard that repeated public rescues create. There have been two MMMF bailouts, so far. The first came at the height of the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, while the second followed in the March 2020 COVID crisis. While the Treasury provided guarantees only once, the Federal Reserve offered emergency liquidity assistance both times.

These repeated government interventions encourage MMMF managers to behave in ways that make future liquidity crises more likely. Moreover, there is no credible way for the Fed to promise not to intervene should a systemic disruption again loom in short-term funding markets. The only realistic means to end the subsidies created by the implicit promise of future bailouts is to force MMMFs to be far more resilient than they are today.

Against this background, the SEC’s December 2021 MMMF reform proposals are seriously disappointing. In this post, we start with basic facts about the scale and mix of MMMFs today. We then describe the SEC’s proposals, before focusing on their key shortcomings. We hope that the public comments that the SEC receives will motivate it, at the very least, to conduct a serious quantitative assessment of introducing capital requirements for the most vulnerable MMMFs, to re-assess the scale of additional liquid assets needed for MMMF resilience in the absence of a Fed backstop, and to propose ways to enhance the effectiveness and utility of MMMF stress tests….

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Setting Bank Capital Requirements

Bank capital requirements are the focus of contentious and heated debates. Since they limit banks’ ability to take on risk and leverage, owners and managers almost always argue for lowering them. To reduce the likelihood of using public funds for further bailouts, both libertarians and progressives argue strenuously that they should be higher. Focusing on the balance between the social benefits of a more resilient financial system and the social costs of curtailing liquidity and loan provision, academicians usually conclude that current levels are too low. So, with well-financed banks and their lobbyists on one side, and a cohort of advocates armed with academic research on the other, regulators are caught in the middle. To whom should they listen?

The answer to this question is an empirical one, so it is important to base any conclusions on a fair and balanced reading of the evidence. Regular readers of this blog will be unsurprised that we continue to maintain that bank capital requirements should be higher than they were even before the Federal Reserve started began its stealth campaign to relax them several years ago. If we were to pick a number, we would start with a leverage ratio—the ratio of common equity to total assets (including off-balance sheet exposures)—that is in the range of 10 to 15 percent, and possibly higher. The risk-weighted equivalent would be about twice as high in the United States (or three times as high in Europe). (The exact numbers depend on the intricacies of accounting standards.) The one thing we would not be arguing for is a further erosion of capital requirements from their current level.

We start with a short reminder about why we need capital requirements in the first place….

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What Risk Professionals Want

As memories of the 2007-09 financial crisis fade, we worry that complacency is setting in. Recent news is not good. In the name of reducing the regulatory burden on small and some medium-sized firms, the Congress and the President enacted legislation that eased the requirements on some of the largest firms. Under the current Administration, several Treasury reports travel the same road, proposing ways to ease regulatory scrutiny of large entities without changing the law (see here, here and here). And, recently, the Federal Reserve Board altered its stress test in ways that make it more likely that poorly managed firms will pass. It also voted not to raise capital requirements on systemically risky banks over the next 12 months.

A few weeks ago, one of us (Steve) had the privilege to speak at the 20th Risk Convention of the Global Association of Risk Professionals (GARP). Founded in 1996, GARP engages in the education and certification of risk professionals and has several hundred thousand members worldwide. (Disclosure: Brandeis International Business School and NYU Stern are GARP Academic Partners.) The organizers allowed us to solicit the views of the 100-plus attendees on two issues that are central to financial resilience: Are bank capital requirements high enough? And, do central counterparties (CCPs) have sufficient loss-absorbing buffers? They answered both questions with a resounding “NO” ….

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Improving resilience: banks and non-bank intermediaries

Debt causes fragility. When banks lack equity funding, even a small adverse shock can put the financial system at risk. Fire sales can undermine the supply of credit to healthy firms, precipitating a decline in economic activity. The failure of key institutions can threaten the payments system. Authorities naturally respond by increasing required levels of equity finance, ensuring that intermediaries can weather severe conditions without damaging others.

Readers of this blog know that we are strong supporters of higher capital requirements: if forced to pick a number, we might choose a leverage ratio requirement in the range of 15% of total exposure (see here), roughly twice recent levels for the largest U.S. banks. But as socially desirable as high levels of equity finance might be, the fact is that they are privately costly. As a result, rather than limit threats to the financial system, higher capital requirements for banks have the potential to shift risky activities beyond the regulatory perimeter into non-bank intermediaries (see, for example here).

Has the increase of capital requirements since the financial crisis pushed risk-taking beyond the regulated banking system? So far, the answer is no. However, in some jurisdictions, especially the United States, the framework for containing systemic risk arising from non-bank financial institutions remains inadequate….

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FEMA for Finance

Modern financial systems are inherently vulnerable. The conversion of savings into investment—a basic function of finance—involves substantial risk. Creditors often demand liquid, short-term, low-risk assets; and borrowers typically wish to finance projects that take time to generate their uncertain returns. Intermediaries that bridge this gap—transforming liquidity, maturity and credit between their assets and liabilities—are subject to runs should risk-averse savers come to doubt the market value of their assets.

The modern financial system is vulnerable in a myriad of other ways as well. For example, if hackers were to suddenly render a key identification technology untrustworthy, it could disable the payments system, bringing a broad swath of economic activity to an abrupt halt. Similarly, the financial infrastructure that implements most transactions—ranging from retail payments to the clearing and settlement of securities and derivatives trades—typically relies on a few enormous hubs that are irreplaceable in the short run. Economies of scale and scope mean that such financial market utilities (FMUs) make transactions cheap, but they also concentrate risk: even their temporary disruption could be catastrophic. (One of our worst nightmares is a cyber-attack that disables the computer and power grid on which our financial system and economy are built.)

With these concerns in mind, we welcome our friend Kathryn Judge’s innovative proposal for a financial “Guarantor of Last Resort”—or emergency guarantee authority (EGA)—as a mechanism for containing financial crises. In this post, we discuss the promise and the pitfalls of Judge’s proposal. Our conclusion is that an EGA would be an excellent tool for managing the fallout from dire threats originating outside the financial system—cyber-terrorism or outright war come to mind. In such circumstances, we see an EGA as a complement to existing conventional efforts at enhancing financial system resilience.

However, the potential for the industry to game an EGA, as well as the very real possibility that politicians will see it as a substitute for rigorous capital and liquidity requirements, make us cautious about its broader applicability. At least initially, this leads us to conclude that the bar for invoking an EGA should be set very high—higher than Judge suggests….

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Bank Capital and Stress Tests: The Foundation of a Thriving Economy

We submitted this statement to the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives for its hearing on July 17, 2018.

We appreciate the opportunity to submit the following statement on the occasion of the hearing entitled “Examining Capital Regimes for Financial Institutions.” We welcome the Subcommittee’s further examination of the existing regulatory approach for prudentially regulated financial institutions.

We are academic experts in financial regulation with extensive knowledge of the financial industry. Our experience includes working with private sector financial institutions, government agencies and international organizations. In our view, a strong and resilient financial system is an essential foundation of a thriving economy. The welfare of every modern society depends on it. The bedrock of this foundation is that banks’ capital buffers are sufficient to withstand significant stress without recourse to public funds. Furthermore, it is our considered view that the benefits of raising U.S. capital requirements from their current modest levels clearly outweigh the costs.

To explain this conclusion, we start with a definition of bank capital, including a discussion of its importance as a mechanism for self-insurance. We then turn to capital regulation and a discussion of stress testing….

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