Money, Banking and Financial Markets

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Commentary

 
 
Posts tagged Policy rate
To improve Fed policy, improve communications

Since May 2021, we have criticized the Federal Reserve’s lagging response to surging inflation. In our view, both policy and communications were inadequate to address the looming challenge. Early this year, we argued that the Fed created a policy crisis by refusing to acknowledge the rise of trend inflation, maintaining a hyper-expansionary policy well after trend inflation reached levels far above their 2% target, and failing to articulate a credible low-inflation policy.

Against this background, we commend the FOMC for its recent efforts. Not only is policy moving quickly in the right direction, but communication improved markedly. In particular, despite the increasing likelihood of a near-term recession, Chair Powell made clear that price stability is necessary for achieving the second part of the Fed’s dual mandate. We suspect that the combination of the Fed’s recent promise to make policy restrictive, along with its improved communications, is playing a key role in anchoring longer-term inflation expectations.

In this post, we focus on central bank communication and its link to policy setting. By far the most important goal of communication is to clarify the authorities’ reaction function: the systematic response of central bank policy to prospective changes in key economy-wide fundamentals—usually inflation and the unemployment rate.

To anticipate our conclusions, we argue for two changes to the FOMC’s quarterly Summary of Economic Projections to better illuminate the Committee reaction function. First, we encourage publication of more detail on individual participants’ responses to link individual projections of inflation, economic growth, and unemployment to the path of the policy rate. Second, we see a role for scenario analysis in which FOMC participants provide their anticipated policy path contingent on one or more adverse supply shocks that present unappealing policy tradeoffs (for example, between the speed of returning inflation to its target and the pace at which the unemployment rate returns to its sustainable level)….

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Steve Cecchetti and Kim SchoenholtzMonetary policy, Interest rate policy, Price stability, Summary of Economic Projections, SEP, Federal Reserve, Federal Open Market Committee, FOMC, Core inflation, Trend inflation, Inflation, Unemployment rate, Noncyclical rate of unemployment, Unemployment gap, Inflation gap, Stagflation, Policy rate, Policy rule, Policy tradeoff, Supply shock, Adverse supply shock, Aggregate demand, Financial conditions, Policy reaction function, Uncertainty, Risk, Forecast bias, Commitment, Scenario analysis
The Costs of Acting Too Little, Too Late

Central bankers that act too little too late risk inflation, recession, or both. Everyone, including the members of the Federal Open Market Committee, knows that the FOMC is late in its current campaign to restore price stability. This makes it essential that they do not do too little.

In this post, we highlight the continued gap between the lessons of past disinflations and the Fed’s hopes and aspirations. We find it difficult to square the FOMC’s latest projections of falling inflation with only modest policy restraint. Simply put, we doubt that the peak projected policy rate from the June Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) will be sufficient to lower inflation to 2% in the absence of a recession.

In our view, boosting the credibility of the FOMC’s price stability commitment will require not only greater realism, but a clarification of how policy would evolve if, as in past large disinflations, the unemployment rate rises by several percentage points. The overly sanguine June SEP simply does not address this key question. Indeed, no FOMC participant anticipates the unemployment rate to rise above 4½% over the forecast horizon….

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Steve Cecchetti and Kim SchoenholtzMonetary policy, Interest rate policy, Summary of Economic Projections, SEP, Federal Reserve, Federal Open Market Committee, FOMC, Core inflation, Headline inflation, Inflation, Services inflation, Trend inflation, Policy rate, Taylor rule, Aggregate demand, Supply shock, Recession, Disinflation, Financial conditions, Oil, Inflation risk, Confidence
Inflation Policy

“Headline” inflation is making painful headlines again. In October, consumer prices rose by 6.2 percent from a year ago—the most rapid gain in at least three decades. Measures of trend inflation also are showing unsettling increases, with the trimmed mean CPI up by 4%. And there are reasons to believe that inflation will stay well above policymakers’ 2% target for an extended period.

In this post, we briefly summarize how we got here and argue that the Federal Reserve needs to change course now. In our view, current monetary policy is far too accommodative. Moreover, the sooner the Fed acts, the more likely it is that policymakers will be able to restore price stability without undermining the post-COVID expansion.

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Steve Cecchetti and Kim SchoenholtzMonetary policy, Interest rate policy, Federal Reserve, Federal Open Market Committee, FOMC, Inflation, Headline inflation, Trend inflation, Inflation expectations, Policy rate, Taylor rule, Policy rule, Federal funds futures, Google trends, Aggregate demand, Aggregate supply, Financial conditions, Volcker, Balanced approach