To improve Fed policy, improve communications

Since May 2021, we have criticized the Federal Reserve’s lagging response to surging inflation. In our view, both policy and communications were inadequate to address the looming challenge. Early this year, we argued that the Fed created a policy crisis by refusing to acknowledge the rise of trend inflation, maintaining a hyper-expansionary policy well after trend inflation reached levels far above their 2% target, and failing to articulate a credible low-inflation policy.

Against this background, we commend the FOMC for its recent efforts. Not only is policy moving quickly in the right direction, but communication improved markedly. In particular, despite the increasing likelihood of a near-term recession, Chair Powell made clear that price stability is necessary for achieving the second part of the Fed’s dual mandate. We suspect that the combination of the Fed’s recent promise to make policy restrictive, along with its improved communications, is playing a key role in anchoring longer-term inflation expectations.

In this post, we focus on central bank communication and its link to policy setting. By far the most important goal of communication is to clarify the authorities’ reaction function: the systematic response of central bank policy to prospective changes in key economy-wide fundamentals—usually inflation and the unemployment rate.

To anticipate our conclusions, we argue for two changes to the FOMC’s quarterly Summary of Economic Projections to better illuminate the Committee reaction function. First, we encourage publication of more detail on individual participants’ responses to link individual projections of inflation, economic growth, and unemployment to the path of the policy rate. Second, we see a role for scenario analysis in which FOMC participants provide their anticipated policy path contingent on one or more adverse supply shocks that present unappealing policy tradeoffs (for example, between the speed of returning inflation to its target and the pace at which the unemployment rate returns to its sustainable level)….

Inflation Policy

“Headline” inflation is making painful headlines again. In October, consumer prices rose by 6.2 percent from a year ago—the most rapid gain in at least three decades. Measures of trend inflation also are showing unsettling increases, with the trimmed mean CPI up by 4%. And there are reasons to believe that inflation will stay well above policymakers’ 2% target for an extended period.

In this post, we briefly summarize how we got here and argue that the Federal Reserve needs to change course now. In our view, current monetary policy is far too accommodative. Moreover, the sooner the Fed acts, the more likely it is that policymakers will be able to restore price stability without undermining the post-COVID expansion.

Just Vote NO

On Tuesday, July 21, the Senate Banking Committee will vote on whether to support Dr. Judy Shelton’s nomination to join the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Accordingly, we are re-posting our July 2019 commentary in which we outlined our strong opposition to Dr. Shelton’s candidacy.

In our view, over the past year, the case against Dr. Shelton has strengthened. The Federal Reserve’s speedy and decisive response to the COVID pandemic is a key reason that the U.S. financial system has steadied and the economy quickly began to recover from the worst shock since the 1930s. Had the United States been operating on a gold standard, as Dr. Shelton has long advocated, these Fed actions would not have been feasible.

Indeed, under a gold standard, instead of easing forcefully and committing to sustained accommodation, the central bank would have been obliged to tighten policy in an effort to resist the 19-percent rise of the gold price since the end of 2019. Just as it did in the Great Depression, this policy would have led us down a path of financial crisis and economic disaster (see our earlier posts here and here).

We hope that the Senate Banking Committee will vote down Dr. Shelton’s candidacy and send a determined message that unambiguously backs the Federal Reserve’s commitment to use every means at its disposal―zero interest rates, large-scale asset purchases, and broad lending programs―to restore economic prosperity and maintain price stability. Barring outright rejection, the Committee should at least move to hold an additional hearing on this nomination, as the Committee minority has proposed….

Qualifying for the Fed

Monetary economists of nearly all persuasions are overwhelming in their condemnation of President Trump’s desire to appoint Stephen Moore and Herman Cain to vacant seats on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. The full-throated case for a high-quality Board offered by Greg Mankiw—former Chief of the Council of Economic Advisers under President George W. Bush—is just one compelling example.

Rather than review President Trump’s picks, in this post we enumerate the key qualities that we believe make a person well suited to serve on the Board. Before getting to any details, we should emphasize our strongly held view that there is no simple prescription—in law or practice―for what makes a successful Federal Reserve Governor. Furthermore, no single person combines all the characteristics needed to make for a successful Board. For that, diversity in thought, preferences, frameworks, decision-making, and experience is essential.

With the benefits of diversity in mind, we highlight three common characteristics that we consider vital for anyone to be an effective Governor (or Reserve Bank President). These are: a deep respect for the Fed’s legal mandate; a clear understanding of an analytic framework that makes policy choices reasonably predictable and effective; and an open-mindedness combined with humility that tempers the application of that framework….

Navigating in Cloudy Skies

Stargazers hate clouds. Even modest levels of humidity and wind make it hard to “see” the wonders of the night sky. Very few places on our planet have consistently clear, dark skies.

Central bankers face a similar, albeit earthly, challenge. Even the simplest economic models require estimation of unobservable factors; something that generates considerable uncertainty. As Vice Chairman Clarida recently explained, the Fed depends on new data not only to assess the current state of the U.S. economy, but also to pin down the factors that drive a wide range of models that guide policymakers’ decisions.

In this post, we highlight how the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) views of two of those “starry” guides—the natural rates of interest (r*) and unemployment (u*)—have evolved in recent years. Like sailors under a cloudy sky, central bankers may need to shift course when the clouds part, revealing that they incorrectly estimated these economic stars. The uncertainty resulting from unavoidable imprecision not only affects policy setting, but also complicates policymakers’ communication, which is one of the keys to making policy effective….

Central Bank Independence: Growing Threats

The median FOMC participant forecasts that the Committee will raise the target range for the federal funds rate three times this year. That is, by the end of 2017, the range will be 1.25 to 1.50 percent. Assuming the FOMC follows through, this will be the first time in a decade that the policy rate has risen by 75 basis points in a year. It is natural to ask what sort of criticism the central bank will face and whether its independence will be threatened.

Our concerns arise from statements made by President-elect Trump during the campaign, as well as from legislative proposals made by various Republican members of Congress and from Fed criticism from those likely to influence the incoming Administration’s policies....

Why a gold standard is a very bad idea

The extraordinary monetary easing engineered by central banks in the aftermath of the 2007-09 financial crisis has fueled criticism of discretionary policy that has taken two forms. The first calls for the Federal Reserve to develop a policy rule and to assess policy relative to a specified reference rule. The second aims for a return to the gold standard (see here and here) to promote price and financial stability. We wrote about policy rules recently. In this post, we explain why a restoration of the gold standard is a profoundly bad idea.

Let’s start with the key conceptual issues. In his 2012 lecture Origins and Mission of the Federal Reserve, then-Federal Reserve Board Chair Ben Bernanke identifies four fundamental problems with the gold standard:...

Commentary

Money, Banking, and Financial Markets