Summary of Economic Projections

To improve Fed policy, improve communications

Since May 2021, we have criticized the Federal Reserve’s lagging response to surging inflation. In our view, both policy and communications were inadequate to address the looming challenge. Early this year, we argued that the Fed created a policy crisis by refusing to acknowledge the rise of trend inflation, maintaining a hyper-expansionary policy well after trend inflation reached levels far above their 2% target, and failing to articulate a credible low-inflation policy.

Against this background, we commend the FOMC for its recent efforts. Not only is policy moving quickly in the right direction, but communication improved markedly. In particular, despite the increasing likelihood of a near-term recession, Chair Powell made clear that price stability is necessary for achieving the second part of the Fed’s dual mandate. We suspect that the combination of the Fed’s recent promise to make policy restrictive, along with its improved communications, is playing a key role in anchoring longer-term inflation expectations.

In this post, we focus on central bank communication and its link to policy setting. By far the most important goal of communication is to clarify the authorities’ reaction function: the systematic response of central bank policy to prospective changes in key economy-wide fundamentals—usually inflation and the unemployment rate.

To anticipate our conclusions, we argue for two changes to the FOMC’s quarterly Summary of Economic Projections to better illuminate the Committee reaction function. First, we encourage publication of more detail on individual participants’ responses to link individual projections of inflation, economic growth, and unemployment to the path of the policy rate. Second, we see a role for scenario analysis in which FOMC participants provide their anticipated policy path contingent on one or more adverse supply shocks that present unappealing policy tradeoffs (for example, between the speed of returning inflation to its target and the pace at which the unemployment rate returns to its sustainable level)….

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The Costs of Acting Too Little, Too Late

Central bankers that act too little too late risk inflation, recession, or both. Everyone, including the members of the Federal Open Market Committee, knows that the FOMC is late in its current campaign to restore price stability. This makes it essential that they do not do too little.

In this post, we highlight the continued gap between the lessons of past disinflations and the Fed’s hopes and aspirations. We find it difficult to square the FOMC’s latest projections of falling inflation with only modest policy restraint. Simply put, we doubt that the peak projected policy rate from the June Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) will be sufficient to lower inflation to 2% in the absence of a recession.

In our view, boosting the credibility of the FOMC’s price stability commitment will require not only greater realism, but a clarification of how policy would evolve if, as in past large disinflations, the unemployment rate rises by several percentage points. The overly sanguine June SEP simply does not address this key question. Indeed, no FOMC participant anticipates the unemployment rate to rise above 4½% over the forecast horizon….

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Harry Potter's Monetary Policy Wand?

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is reassuring us that, so long as we are patient, price stability will return without further pain. But its narrative seems less grounded in historical experience and more like something Harry Potter might have conjured at Hogwarts. By the end of 2024, the Committee expects trend inflation (measured by the price index of personal consumption expenditures excluding food and energy) to drop by more than 3 percentage points while economic growth remains above (and the unemployment rate below) its sustainable level. And, all this magic materializes with the real (inflation-adjusted) policy rate barely turning positive.

The principal means by which the Fed affects the inflation outlook is by influencing financial conditions. Yet, having telegraphed its policy shift for months, the FOMC’s most recent actions on March 16—initiating a series of rate hikes and suggesting that balance sheet tapering could begin soon—barely affected the ease with which firms and households obtain financing. And, while financial conditions are indeed a bit tighter than six months ago—when about one-half of FOMC participants anticipated no interest rate hikes in 2022—these conditions remain quite accommodative (see here).

Is the FOMC’s current policy path consistent with its longer-term price stability goals? In this post, we address this question by exploring policymakers’ newly published projections. Our conclusion is that bringing the inflation trend back to 2% will require a tightening of financial conditions significantly beyond what the Fed currently envisions….

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Fed Monetary Policy in Crisis

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is facing a crisis of its own making. The crisis has four elements. Policymakers failed to forecast the rise in inflation. They failed to appreciate how persistent inflation can be. They are failing to articulate a credible low inflation policy. And, so far, there is little sign that monetary policymakers recognize the need to react decisively.

Our fear is that matters have now progressed to the stage where the Fed’s credibility for delivering price stability is at serious risk. And, as experience teaches us, the less credible the central bank, the more painful it is to lower inflation to target.

In this post, we discuss the policy crisis and suggest how to respond. In our view, the FOMC needs a plan to raise rates quickly and substantially. For the FOMC to ensure inflation returns to its target of 2%, policymakers likely will need to bring the short-term real interest rate into significantly positive territory. Put slightly differently, we suspect that the policy rate needs to rise to at least one percent above expected inflation.

Won’t a sharp policy tightening trigger a huge recession? In our view, credibility is the key to how much pain disinflation will cause. Applying the painful lesson of the 1970s and early 1980s leads us to conclude that the FOMC now needs to show clear resolve. Inflation rose very quickly over the past year, so it may still be possible to bring it down sharply without a recession. The more decisively policymakers act, the lower the long-run costs are likely to be. Failure to restore price stability in a timely way would almost surely render this expansion disturbingly short compared to recent norms.

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From Inflation Targeting to Employment Targeting?

Last year, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) modified its monetary policy framework to focus on average inflation targeting. They stated that “appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2% for some time” after “periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2%.” At the same time, the Committee scaled back efforts to preempt inflation, introducing an asymmetric “shortfall” strategy which responds to employment only when it falls below its estimated maximum. FOMC participants view these strategic changes as means to secure their legally mandated dual objectives of price stability and maximum employment (see our earlier posts here and here).

Prior to this week’s FOMC meeting, the Committee’s forward guidance explicitly balanced these two goals. However, in what we view as a remarkable shift, changes in the December 15 statement are difficult to square with any type of inflation targeting strategy. Despite the recent surge of inflation, the Committee’s new forward guidance removes any mention of price stability as a condition for keeping policy rates near zero. Instead, it focuses exclusively on reaching maximum employment.

In this post, we provide two reasons why such an unbalanced approach is concerning. First, a monetary policy strategy that ranks maximum employment well above price stability is unlikely to secure price stability over the long run. Second, FOMC participants’ projections for 2022-24 are a combination of strong economic growth, further labor market tightening and a policy rate well below long-run norms. This mix seems inconsistent with the large decline in trend inflation that participants anticipate. While policymakers certainly can and do revise their projections, persistent underestimates of inflation fuel the perception that price stability is a secondary, rather than equal, goal of policy….

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Talking about Tapering

In May, we argued that the FOMC needed to communicate its contingency plans for what they would do should the recent inflation pickup prove more stubborn than its members expect. Such transparency makes it more likely that financial markets will respond to incoming data rather than to policymakers’ actions. By clearly laying out their reaction function, central bankers can avoid disruptions like market taper tantrums.

In June, the FOMC began to remove the self-imposed communication shackles designed to encourage “lower for longer” interest rate expectations and address inflation risks more openly. Indeed, as the above citation from Chairman Powell indicates, at their June meeting, policymakers began to lay the groundwork for scaling back their large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs).

In this post, we start by highlighting how recent Fed communication (which reveals appropriate humility about inflation projections) has helped avoid a market tantrum so far. Along the way, we discuss the various means that FOMC participants have used to express their changing views about the timing of interest rate increases (“liftoff”), even as they make clear that tapering their asset purchases will come first….

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Stopping central banks from being prisoners of financial markets

Central banks are on the front lines in the fight to limit the impact of the pandemic. They are supporting virtually every aspect of the economy and the financial system. Combined with the massive fiscal support, these policies restored market stability, safeguarded financial institutions, and reduced suffering. Count us among those who firmly believe that everyone would be in worse shape had central banks and fiscal authorities not coordinated this aid as they did.

But, by providing such a broad backstop, the reliance of financial markets on that support can itself become a source of instability. This raises a set of very important and pressing questions: Have central banks’ actions over the past year made financial markets their masters? Can policymakers now be counted on to suppress financial volatility wherever it arises?

We surely hope not, but we see this as a legitimate concern. Fortunately, we also see a solution. Central bankers should strive to duplicate the success of their framework for interest rate policy. That is, they should be clear and transparent about their reaction function for all their policy tools. Knowing how policy will react, markets will respond directly to news regarding economic conditions, and less to policymakers’ commentary. Of course, central bankers cannot ignore shocks that threaten economic and price stability. But cushioning the economy against large financial disturbances does not mean minimizing market volatility….

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Is Inflation Coming?

For more than a generation, the U.S. inflation-targeting framework has delivered impressive results. From 1995 to 2007, U.S. inflation averaged 2.1% (as measured by the Federal Reserve’s preferred index). Since 2008, average inflation dropped to only 1.5%, but expectations have fluctuated in a narrow range: for example, the market-based five-year, five-year forward (CPI) inflation expectation rarely dipped below 1.5% and never exceeded 3%.

However, the pandemic brought with it many dramatic changes. Fiscal and monetary policy mobilized, responding swiftly to the economic plunge with a combination of extraordinary debt-financed expenditure and balance sheet expansion. As a matter of accounting and arithmetic, these actions have had a profound impact on the balance sheets of banks and households, spurring dramatic growth in traditional monetary aggregates. From the end of February to the end of May 2020, broad money (M2) grew from $15.5 trillion to $17.9 trillion—a 16% jump in just three months.

Won’t the record 2020 gain in M2 be highly inflationary? We doubt it, and in this post we explain why. At the same time, we highlight the chronic uncertainty that plagues inflation. In our view, the difficulty in forecasting inflation makes it important that the Fed routinely communicate how it will react to inflation surprises—even when, as now, policymakers wish to promote extremely accommodative financial conditions….

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The Fed's Crystal Ball: Looking Beyond the COVID-19 Recession

Over the past 75 years, no one has seen anything like the COVID-19 shock to the global economy. Nor have we seen anything like the swift, broad and massive fiscal and monetary expansion that followed.

In the United States, the economic rebound has started. As states and municipalities relax the lockdown, businesses closed by the virus are gradually reopening and employment is rising. But, there remains tremendous uncertainty about the speed and extent of the recovery.

This was the backdrop for the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) release last week of its June Summary of Economic Projections (SEP)—the first SEP since December. Unsurprisingly, attention usually focuses on the FOMC’s interest rate projections: with the exception of two participants, the Committee does not anticipate an interest rate increase over the forecast horizon to the end of 2022.

In this post, we concentrate on the Committee’s projections for the real economy. Our conclusion is that these contain two elements of optimism. First, while the recession is clearly the worst since the 1930s, FOMC participants believe that the recovery will be roughly twice as fast as the one from the GFC. Second, their projections are that longer-run economic growth will match the pre-COVID pace. That is, in contrast to the GFC experience, COVID-19 will not usher in a slowdown in trend growth. Compared to the FOMC, we believe there is room for disappointment, especially with regard to the longer run.

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Improving U.S. Monetary Policy Communications

Tomorrow, June 4, we will present our paper, Improving U.S. Monetary Policy Communications, as part of the Federal Reserve’s review of its monetary policy strategy, tools, and communications practices. This post summarizes our methodology, analysis and recommendations.

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Since the mid-1990s, the U.S. economy has been reaping the benefits of a credible commitment to price stability, including a communications framework that reinforces that commitment. Over the same period, both the level and uncertainty of inflation have declined (see here).  It is against this backdrop that we look for further enhancements in the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) communications framework.

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