Balance sheet

A Primer on Private Sector Balance Sheets

Double-entry bookkeeping is an extremely powerful concept. Dating at least from the 13th century (or possibly much earlier), it is the idea that any increase or decrease on one side of an entity’s balance sheet has an equal and opposite impact on the other side of the balance sheet. Put differently, whenever an asset increases, either another asset must decrease, or the sum of liabilities plus net worth must increase by the same amount.

In this post, we provide a primer on the nature and usefulness of private sector balance sheets: those of households, nonfinancial firms, and financial intermediaries. As we will see, a balance sheet provides extremely important and useful information. First, it gives us a measure of net worth that determines whether an entity is solvent and quantifies how far it is from bankruptcy. This tells us whether an indebted firm or household is likely to default on its obligations. Second, the structure of assets and liabilities helps us to assess an entity’s ability to meet a lender’s immediate demand for the return of funds. For example, how resilient is a bank to deposit withdrawals?

After discussing how balance sheets work, we show how to apply the lessons to the November 2007 balance sheet of Lehman Brothers—nearly a year before its collapse on September 15, 2008….

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Is Inflation Coming?

For more than a generation, the U.S. inflation-targeting framework has delivered impressive results. From 1995 to 2007, U.S. inflation averaged 2.1% (as measured by the Federal Reserve’s preferred index). Since 2008, average inflation dropped to only 1.5%, but expectations have fluctuated in a narrow range: for example, the market-based five-year, five-year forward (CPI) inflation expectation rarely dipped below 1.5% and never exceeded 3%.

However, the pandemic brought with it many dramatic changes. Fiscal and monetary policy mobilized, responding swiftly to the economic plunge with a combination of extraordinary debt-financed expenditure and balance sheet expansion. As a matter of accounting and arithmetic, these actions have had a profound impact on the balance sheets of banks and households, spurring dramatic growth in traditional monetary aggregates. From the end of February to the end of May 2020, broad money (M2) grew from $15.5 trillion to $17.9 trillion—a 16% jump in just three months.

Won’t the record 2020 gain in M2 be highly inflationary? We doubt it, and in this post we explain why. At the same time, we highlight the chronic uncertainty that plagues inflation. In our view, the difficulty in forecasting inflation makes it important that the Fed routinely communicate how it will react to inflation surprises—even when, as now, policymakers wish to promote extremely accommodative financial conditions….

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Fed's big stick lets it speak powerfully

The powerful stabilizing impact of the Federal Reserve’s COVID response is visible virtually across U.S. financial markets. What is most remarkable about this is how little the Fed has done to achieve these outcomes. To be sure, the central bank now holds $7 trillion in assets, an increase of $2.8 trillion since early March. Yet, virtually all the increase reflects large-scale purchases of government-guaranteed instruments. What we find astonishing is that the acquisition of risky nonfinancial debt remains tiny.

The point is clear: backed by massive fiscal support, the Fed’s mere announcement of its willingness to purchase corporate and municipal bonds, as well as asset-backed securities, has proven sufficient to stabilize markets despite the worst economic shock since WWII. Put differently, the Fed’s willingness to backstop markets has obviated the need to serve actively as a market maker of last resort.

In this post, we document these developments and then speculate about their implications. For one thing, in a future crisis where the U.S. fiscal and monetary authorities share key goals, people will now anticipate that the central bank will backstop financial markets. Because a central bank is almost certain to intervene when systemic risks rise, these stabilizing powers are welcome.

At the same time, the central bank’s backstop is a source of potentially serious moral hazard. We suspect that investors are now counting on Fed stimulus to support equity and bond prices (and possibly bank loans) even as household and business insolvencies rise. Yet, in a market economy, it is shareholders and creditors who ultimately must bear these losses. Indeed, were the U.S. equity market to plunge by 40 percent in the remainder of 2020, that by itself would pose little threat to the financial system, and ought not trigger large corporate bond (let alone equity) purchases by the central bank….

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The Fed Goes to War: Part 3

For the second time this century, the Federal Reserve is a crisis manager. In this role, policymakers can lend to solvent but illiquid intermediaries (as the lender of last resort). They can backstop financial markets (as a market maker of last resort). And, when all else fails, they can take the place of dysfunctional private-sector intermediaries.

During the first financial crisis of the 21st century, the Fed’s response shifted from one role to the next as the crisis intensified. Yet, even compared to that massive crisis response, the Fed’s recent moves are breathtaking—in speed, scale and scope.

Indeed, with its most recent announcements on April 9, the Federal Reserve is committed to an unprecedented course of action to ensure the flow of credit to virtually every part of the economy. In carrying out its obligations under the newly enacted CARES Act, the Fed is effectively transforming itself into a state bank that allocates credit to the nonfinancial sectors of the economy.

Yet, picking winners and losers is not a sustainable assignment for independent technocrats. It is a role for fiscal authorities, not central bankers. Instead of using the Fed as an off-balance sheet vehicle for the federal government, we hope that Congress will shift these CARES Act obligations from the Federal Reserve to the Treasury, where they belong….

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Monetary Policy Operations Redux

On September 17, the overnight Treasury repurchase agreement (repo) rate spiked to 6%—up from just 2.2% a week earlier and the highest level in more than 15 years (see DTCC GCF repo index). Oddly, this turmoil occurred at a time when the Fed had begun lowering its policy rate for the first time in more than a decade and market participants anticipated further policy easing ahead.

What led to this sudden disruption in short-term funding markets that been relatively calm in recent years? Had the Fed lost control? In our view, the explanation for the sudden rise in overnight interest rates is straightforward: the shrinkage of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet that began in October 2017 reduced the aggregate supply of reserves gradually to where banks’ demand for reserves was insensitive to interest rates. Consequently, large temporary fluctuations in the supply of reserves that would have had virtually no impact even a few months ago, triggered sizable upward interest rate fluctuations.

Consistent with this view, the Federal Reserve recently took action to prevent a recurrence of the September disorder. At an unscheduled video conference meeting on October 11, the FOMC agreed to additional regular purchases of Treasury bills at least into the second quarter of 2020. The goal of this balance sheet expansion is to maintain reserve balances at least as high as their level in early-September before the turmoil began.

In the remainder of this post, we discuss the evolution of the supply and demand for reserves in recent years. We argue that, because no one—including the Fed—knew the precise level of reserves at which the demand curve would become inelastic, an episode like the one on September 17 was virtually inescapable as reserve supply declined. If our diagnosis of the cause is correct, then recent actions should help put the issue to rest. Yet, given the inevitability of the event―that the day would come when shrinking reserve supply hit the inelastic part of the reserve demand curve―the Fed could (and should) have been prepared. If so, it could have avoided even a temporary dent in its well-deserved reputation for operational prowess….

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Bank Financing: The Disappearance of Interbank Lending

Retail bank runs are mostly a thing of the past. Every jurisdiction with a banking system has some form of deposit insurance, whether explicit or implicit. So, most customers can rest assured that they will be compensated even should their bank fail. But, while small and medium-sized depositors are extremely unlikely to feel the need to run, the same cannot be said for large short-term creditors (whose claims usually exceed the cap on deposit insurance). As we saw in the crisis a decade ago, when they are funded by short-term borrowing, not only are banks (and other intermediaries) vulnerable, the entire financial system becomes fragile.

This belated realization has motivated a large shift in the structure of bank funding since the crisis. Two complementary forces have been at work, one coming from within the institutions and the other from the authorities overseeing the system. This post highlights the biggest of these changes: the spectacular fall in uncollateralized interbank lending and the smaller, but still dramatic, decline in the use of repurchase agreements. The latter—also called repo—amounts to a short-term collateralized loan....

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Understanding Bank Capital: A Primer

Over the past 40 years, U.S. capital markets have grown much faster than banks, so that banks’ share of credit to the private nonfinancial sector has dropped from 55% to 34% (see BIS statistics here).  Nevertheless, banks remain a critical part of the financial system. They operate the payments system, supply credit, and serve as agents and catalysts for a wide range of other financial transactions. As a result, their well-being remains a key concern. A resilient banking system is, above all, one that has sufficient capital to weather the loan defaults and declines in asset values that will inevitably come.

In this primer, we explain the nature of bank capital, highlighting its role as a form of self-insurance providing both a buffer against unforeseen losses and an incentive to manage risk-taking. We describe some of the challenges in measuring capital and briefly discuss a range of approaches for setting capital requirements. While we do not know the optimal level of capital that banks (or other intermediaries) should be required to hold, we suggest a practical approach for setting requirements that would promote the safety of the financial system without diminishing its efficiency....

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