Money, Banking and Financial Markets

Commentary

Commentary

 
 
Posts tagged Primary dealer
Making the Treasury Market Resilient

Ensuring financial stability requires resilient institutions. That is why regulators around the world have strengthened capital and liquidity requirements for the largest financial intermediaries since financial crisis of 2007-09.

Making financial markets resilient is equally important. Repeated and sustained bouts of illiquidity and dysfunctionality in a key market can threaten the well-being of even the healthiest institutions.

In a global financial system that runs on dollars, the most important financial market is the one for U.S. Treasury securities. Yet, despite its importance and general reliability, the Treasury market occasionally suffers from serious disruptions. The strains in the Treasury market during the first half of March 2020 became an important motivation for the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented anti-COVID policy actions beginning that month (see here, here and here).

In the remainder of this post, we describe the COVID-induced troubles in the Treasury market and highlight Duffie’s compelling proposal to consider requiring central clearing of U.S. Treasuries. We endorse Duffie’s call to study such a mandate, and view this is as an important element of a broader effort to modernize and reinforce the financial infrastructure….

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Steve Cecchetti and Kim SchoenholtzTreasury, Treasuries, Liquidity, Market resilience, Federal Reserve, COVID-19, Monetary policy, Off- vs. on-the-run spread, Collateral, Reserve currency, Foreign exchange reserves, Foreign currency reserves, Liquidity risk, Maturity risk, Credit risk, Benchmark, Reference rate, Yield volatility, TRACE, Primary dealer, Automated trading systems, ATS
The Fed Goes to War: Part 1

Over the past two weeks, the Federal Reserve has resurrected many of the policy tools that took many months to develop during the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-09 and several years to refine during the post-crisis recovery. The Fed was then learning through trial and error how to serve as an effective lender of last resort (see Tucker) and how to deploy the “new monetary policy tools” that are now part of central banks’ standard weaponry.

The good news is that the Fed’s crisis management muscles remain strong. The bad news is that the challenges of the Corona War are unprecedented. Success will require extraordinary creativity and flexibility from every part of the government. As in any war, the central bank needs to find additional ways to support the government’s efforts to steady the economy. A key challenge is to do so in a manner that allows for a smooth return to “peacetime” policy practices when the war is past.

In this post, we review the rationale for reintroducing the resurrected policy tools, distinguishing between those intended to restore market function or substitute for private intermediation, and those meant to alter financial conditions to support aggregate demand….

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Steve Cecchetti and Kim SchoenholtzLender of last resort, LOLR, Expired monetary policy tools, New monetary policy tools, Coronavirus, COVID-19, Federal Reserve Act, FRA Section 13(3), Quantitative easing, QE, Targeted asset purchases, TAP, VIX, Volatility, Commercial paper, CPFF, Primary dealer, PDCF, Money market mutual fund, MMMF, MMLF, Central bank independence, Helicopter money, Fiscal dominance
Bank Financing: The Disappearance of Interbank Lending

Retail bank runs are mostly a thing of the past. Every jurisdiction with a banking system has some form of deposit insurance, whether explicit or implicit. So, most customers can rest assured that they will be compensated even should their bank fail. But, while small and medium-sized depositors are extremely unlikely to feel the need to run, the same cannot be said for large short-term creditors (whose claims usually exceed the cap on deposit insurance). As we saw in the crisis a decade ago, when they are funded by short-term borrowing, not only are banks (and other intermediaries) vulnerable, the entire financial system becomes fragile.

This belated realization has motivated a large shift in the structure of bank funding since the crisis. Two complementary forces have been at work, one coming from within the institutions and the other from the authorities overseeing the system. This post highlights the biggest of these changes: the spectacular fall in uncollateralized interbank lending and the smaller, but still dramatic, decline in the use of repurchase agreements. The latter—also called repo—amounts to a short-term collateralized loan....

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Steve Cecchetti and Kim SchoenholtzBank liabilities, Balance sheet, Retail banking, Deposits, Deposit insurance, Funding, Repurchase agreement, Repo, Collateral, Interbank lending, Liquidity coverage ratio, LCR, Leverage ratio, Bank credit, Price-to-book ratio, Securitized banking, Securitization, Primary dealer, Tri-party repo, Counterparty risk, Basel III, ABCP, SPV, Special-purpose vehicle, Off-balance sheet, Excess reserves, Large-scale asset purchases, Return on equity, ROE, De facto bank