QE

The QE Ratchet

When it comes to quantitative easing (QE), where you stand definitely depends on where you sit. That is among the conclusions of the important new report of the Economic Affairs Committee of the UK House of Lords.

The report provides an excellent survey of how it is that central banks now use their balance sheets. Its key conclusions are the following. First, central bankers should clearly communicate the rationale for their balance sheet actions, stating what they are doing and why. Second, policymakers should provide more detail on their estimates (and uncertainties) of the effectiveness of their various actions, especially QE. Third, they should be aware that the relationship between central bank balance sheet policy and government debt management policy poses a risk to independence. Finally, and most importantly, central bankers need an exit plan for how they will return to a long-run sustainable level for their balance sheet.

We discussed several of these points in prior posts. On communication, we argued that central bankers should be clear about their reaction function for both interest rate and balance sheet policies (see here). On the justification for policymakers’ actions, we emphasized the need for clear, simple explanations tied to policymakers’ objectives, distinguishing carefully between the intended purposes (such as monetary policy, lender/market maker of last resort, or emergency government finance; see here). And, on the relationship between QE and fiscal finance, we noted how the ballooning of the U.S. Treasury’s balance at the Fed in the early stages of the pandemic looked like monetary finance, putting independence at risk (see here).

In this post, we turn to the challenge that Lord King highlights in the opening quote: the need to ensure that central banks do not see bond purchases as a cure-all for every ill that befalls the economy and the financial system, causing their balance sheets repeatedly to ratchet upward….

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Understanding How Central Banks Use Their Balance Sheets: A Critical Categorization

This comment is jointly authored by Stephen G. Cecchetti and Sir Paul M.W. Tucker.

Central banks have been reinvented over the past decade, first in response to the financial crisis, and then as a consequence of Covid-19. While trying to maintain monetary stability and promote economic recovery, their balance sheets have ballooned. In 2007, the central banks in the United States, euro area, United Kingdom, and Japan had total assets from 6% to 20% of nominal GDP. By the end of 2020, the Fed’s balance sheet was 34% of GDP, the ECB’s 59%, the Bank of England’s 40%, and the Bank of Japan’s 127%.

Before it is possible to consider how well this worked, it is necessary to be clear about what policymakers’ various operations were trying to achieve. Headline declarations of aiming at “price stability” or “financial stability” are unsatisfactory as they jump to end goals without attending to the motivations for specific operations and facilities. The case of the Fed is illustrative. Among other things, they bought U.S. Treasury bonds, offered to purchase commercial paper, corporate and municipal bonds, and set up facilities to lend directly to real-economy businesses as well as to securities dealers. These cannot be assessed solely on whether, alone or together, each materially improved the outlook for economic activity and inflation.

Without a sense of the intended purpose of each central bank action, it is difficult for political overseers or interested members of the public to hold central banks accountable. Precisely because central banks are independent (rightly in our view), that accountability takes the form of public scrutiny and debate. But we argue that it is also hard for central bankers themselves to do their jobs unless they distinguish carefully—in internal deliberations, and external communication—the rationale for different interventions….

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Helicopters to the Rescue?

Is helicopter money here? Do we need it now? Is it coming? The short answer to these questions is that it is not here and we currently do not need it, but should the economic disaster brought on by COVID-19 continue for much longer, that might change.

To be clear, the relief checks that governments are sending out to households and businesses are not helicopter money. Despite their enormous scale, the financing of these transfers is no different in character from that of traditional government benefits: governments are collecting taxes and issuing debt to the public.

Helicopter money is when the central bank finances government expenditure directly. In these circumstances, the fiscal authority, through its debt management policies, controls the size of the central bank’s balance sheet. This is monetary finance arising from fiscal dominance: to increase seignorage, the fiscal authority usurps the role of the independent central bank in determining the size of base money (currency plus reserves held by banks at the central bank).

Should monetary policymakers consider surrendering their independence in this way? In our view, a far better alternative is to peg the long-term interest rate at zero. Currently in use by the Bank of Japan, this policy of yield curve control allows central banks to retain a small, but significant degree of monetary control. It also captures the features of U.S. monetary policy from 1937 to 1951, when the Fed capped the long-term bond yield to support U.S. wartime finance (see here)….

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The Fed Goes to War: Part 2

In this note, we update our earlier comment on the first set of Fed actions that appeared on March 23 just as a slew of new ones arrived.

While most of the changes represent simple extensions of previous tools, the Fed also has introduced facilities that are going to involve it deeply in the allocation of credit to private nonfinancial firms. Choices of whom to fund are inherently political, and hence destined to be controversial. Engaging in such decisions will make it far more difficult for the Fed eventually to return to the standard of central bank independence that it has guarded for decades. We urge the Fed to limit its involvement in the allocation of credit to the private nonfinancial sector. And, should Congress deem it necessary, we encourage them to provide explicit authorization to the Treasury (along with the resources) to take on this crisis role.

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The Fed Goes to War: Part 1

Over the past two weeks, the Federal Reserve has resurrected many of the policy tools that took many months to develop during the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-09 and several years to refine during the post-crisis recovery. The Fed was then learning through trial and error how to serve as an effective lender of last resort (see Tucker) and how to deploy the “new monetary policy tools” that are now part of central banks’ standard weaponry.

The good news is that the Fed’s crisis management muscles remain strong. The bad news is that the challenges of the Corona War are unprecedented. Success will require extraordinary creativity and flexibility from every part of the government. As in any war, the central bank needs to find additional ways to support the government’s efforts to steady the economy. A key challenge is to do so in a manner that allows for a smooth return to “peacetime” policy practices when the war is past.

In this post, we review the rationale for reintroducing the resurrected policy tools, distinguishing between those intended to restore market function or substitute for private intermediation, and those meant to alter financial conditions to support aggregate demand….

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Monetary Policy in the Next Recession?

In many advanced countries, lowering the policy rate to zero will be insufficient to counter the next recession. In the United States, for example, with the target range for the federal funds rate at 1½ to 1¾ percent, there is little scope for the nearly 5 percentage-point easing that is typical in recent recessions (see, for example, Kiley).

This is the setting for this year’s report for the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, written with Michael Feroli, Anil Kashyap and Catherine Mann. Our analysis focuses on the extent to which the “new tools” of monetary policy—including quantitative easing, forward guidance and negative interest rates—have been associated with an improvement of financial conditions. The idea is that the transmission of monetary policy to economic activity and prices works primarily through its effect on a broad array of financial conditions.

The USMPF report does not challenge the views of many researchers and of most central banks that the new monetary policy (NMP) tools have an expansionary impact even at the effective lower bound for nominal interest rates (see also the 2019 report from the Committee on the Global Financial System). However, we find that these new tools generally were not sufficient to overcome the powerful headwinds that prevailed in many advanced economies over the past decade.

Our conclusion is that central bankers should clearly incorporate the new tools in their reaction functions and communications strategies, but should be humble about their likely success in countering the next recession, at least in the absence of other supportive actions (such as fiscal stimulus)….

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Monetary Policy Operations Redux

On September 17, the overnight Treasury repurchase agreement (repo) rate spiked to 6%—up from just 2.2% a week earlier and the highest level in more than 15 years (see DTCC GCF repo index). Oddly, this turmoil occurred at a time when the Fed had begun lowering its policy rate for the first time in more than a decade and market participants anticipated further policy easing ahead.

What led to this sudden disruption in short-term funding markets that been relatively calm in recent years? Had the Fed lost control? In our view, the explanation for the sudden rise in overnight interest rates is straightforward: the shrinkage of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet that began in October 2017 reduced the aggregate supply of reserves gradually to where banks’ demand for reserves was insensitive to interest rates. Consequently, large temporary fluctuations in the supply of reserves that would have had virtually no impact even a few months ago, triggered sizable upward interest rate fluctuations.

Consistent with this view, the Federal Reserve recently took action to prevent a recurrence of the September disorder. At an unscheduled video conference meeting on October 11, the FOMC agreed to additional regular purchases of Treasury bills at least into the second quarter of 2020. The goal of this balance sheet expansion is to maintain reserve balances at least as high as their level in early-September before the turmoil began.

In the remainder of this post, we discuss the evolution of the supply and demand for reserves in recent years. We argue that, because no one—including the Fed—knew the precise level of reserves at which the demand curve would become inelastic, an episode like the one on September 17 was virtually inescapable as reserve supply declined. If our diagnosis of the cause is correct, then recent actions should help put the issue to rest. Yet, given the inevitability of the event―that the day would come when shrinking reserve supply hit the inelastic part of the reserve demand curve―the Fed could (and should) have been prepared. If so, it could have avoided even a temporary dent in its well-deserved reputation for operational prowess….

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Relying on the Fed's Balance Sheet

Last week’s 12th annual U.S. Monetary Policy Forum focused on the effectiveness of Fed large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) as an instrument of monetary policy. Despite notable disagreements, the report and discussion reveal a broad (if not universal) consensus on key issues:

In a world of low equilibrium real interest rates and low inflation, policymakers could easily hit the zero lower bound (ZLB) in the next recession.

At the ZLB, the Fed should again use a combination of balance-sheet tools and interest-rate forward-guidance to achieve its mandated objectives of stable prices and maximum sustainable employment (see our earlier post).

Yet, significant uncertainties about the impact of balance-sheet expansion mean that LSAPs may not provide sufficient stimulus at the ZLB.

Fed policymakers should undertake a thorough (and potentially lengthy) assessment of alternative policy tools and frameworks—ranging from negative interest rates to a higher inflation target to forms of price-level targeting—to ensure they remain as effective as possible.

The remainder of this post discusses the challenges of measuring the impact of balance-sheet policies. As the now-extensive literature on the subject implies, balance-sheet expansions ease financial conditions. However, as this year’s USMPF report emphasizes, there is substantial uncertainty about the scale of that impact.... 

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Central Banks and Systematic Risks

Modern economies are built by businesses that take risk. As Edison’s defense suggests, successful risk-takers need scope to experiment without distraction. Economies lacking institutions to support risk-taking are prone to stagnation.

By securing economic and financial stability, central banks play a key role in promoting the risk-taking that is fundamental to innovation and capital formation. On rare occasions, it is officials’  bold willingness to do “whatever it takes” that does the job. More often, it is a series of moderate, gradual actions. Yet, even then, the understanding that the central bank has the broad capacity to act—and, when necessary, to do so without limit—is a key factor underpinning the stability of the system...

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