Pandemic

Central Banks' New Frontier: Interventions in Securities Markets

In his 2016 book The End of Alchemy, our friend and former Bank of England Governor Mervyn King provided a template for financial reform aimed at reducing the frequency and severity of crises. At the time, we were very cautious for two reasons. First, we believed that adoption of King’s framework would vastly increase the influence of central banks on private financial markets, something that could ultimately lead to a misallocation of resources in the economy and to a diminution of the independence of monetary policy that is necessary for securing price stability. Second, we doubted that most central banks had the technical capacity to implement the proposal.

Well, the landscape has changed significantly. During the pandemic, central banks intervened massively in private securities markets and there now appears to be no turning back. In a number of jurisdictions, monetary policymakers broadened the scale and scope of their lending and intervened directly in financial markets, going significantly beyond even their extraordinary actions during the 2007-09 financial crisis. As a result, we likely will be paying the costs that we feared could accompany the implementation of King’s proposal, so we might as well reap the benefits.

In this post, we discuss central banks’ pandemic interventions and the type of infrastructure needed to support them. We then review King’s proposal, highlighting how adopting his approach would make the financial system safer, while radically simplifying the role of regulators and supervisors ….

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Can vacancies plunge without a significant rise of unemployment?

The primary objective of central bankers is to maintain low and stable inflation. While this task was never easy, the recent bout of large, adverse supply shocks—from the pandemic to the Russian invasion of Ukraine—combined with massive demand stimulus (both fiscal and monetary) made the task of securing price stability far more difficult.

Our favored indicator of the inflation trend, the Dallas Fed’s trimmed mean PCE price index, rose at a 4.4% annual rate over the past six months, and seems to be accelerating. Furthermore, while activity has slowed, the U.S. labor market remains extraordinarily tight: there are nearly two vacancies for each person who is unemployed—well above the peaks of the early 1950s and the late 1960s.

Against this background, a large, recession-free disinflation seems highly unlikely to us (see our recent post). In theory, a plunge of vacancies could cool a very hot labor market without raising unemployment (see, for example, Waller). In practice, however, the behavior of the relationship between vacancies and unemployment since 1950—what is known as the Beveridge Curve—suggests that this is very unlikely (see Blanchard, Domash and Summers).

That is the subject of this post….

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Limiting Central Banking

Since 2007, and especially over the past year, actions of public officials have blurred the lines between monetary and fiscal policy almost beyond recognition. Central banks have expanded both the scope and scale of their interventions in unprecedented fashion. This fiscalization risks central bank independence, thereby weakening policymakers’ ability to deliver on their mandates for price and financial stability. In our view, to find a way to back to the pre-2008 division of responsibilities, officials must establish clearer limits on what central banks can and cannot do.

In that division of official labor, it is fiscal authorities that ought to make the unavoidably political choices that directly influence resource allocation. And governments should not conceal such fiscal actions on the balance sheet of the central bank. In a democracy, doing so lacks legitimacy and would become unsustainable….

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Where Governments Should Spend More

As a result of the pandemic, U.S. general government debt (federal, state, and local obligations combined) has surged above 130 percent of GDP, more than double what it was in 2007. And, recent U.S. experience is far from unique. Looking at the G20, average public debt rose from 52% of GDP in 2007 to 74% in 2019 and is projected to reach 91% next year.

Unsurprisingly, as government debt increases, the debate over public spending heats up. Are these high debt ratios sustainable? Should we be cutting spending and raising taxes to reduce what will otherwise be a large financial burden on future generations?

In this post, we emphasize that not all government spending is created equal. Investment in physical infrastructure, as well as in education and health—especially for children—can boost future GDP. Moreover, delaying inevitable outlays can boost long-run costs. As a result, a failure to make productive, self-financing investments due to concerns about the debt would be not only tragic, but counterproductive….

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An Economic Zombie Survival Guide

Everyone surely hopes that zombies will remain confined to the growing list of horror movies. But unless we shut them down, insolvent firms can become economic zombies that suffocate innovation and growth.

As the COVID pandemic continues, policymakers will face some difficult decisions. Many businesses are coming under increasingly severe financial stress. Some, like dry-cleaning establishments that rely on laundering clothing for office workers, have limited prospects even after the pandemic subsides. But there are others that have a bright post-COVID future if they can hold on long enough. Without a way to distinguish these two groups, we face an unpleasant choice of either creating zombies or allowing viable firms to perish.

In our view, the solution to this problem is to reinforce and modify the bankruptcy process. This means ensuring that there are sufficient resources to restructure the debts of those whose expected future profits exceed their liquidation value, while allowing the remainder to close. In the case of large corporations, we can make use of Chapter 11. For smaller firms, if it is not already too late, we need a low-cost mechanism more tailored to their needs.

In the remainder of this post, we discuss these two related issues: zombie firms and the use of bankruptcy procedures to identify and sustain viable firms.

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The Price is Not Right: Measuring Inflation in a Pandemic

Are prices really plummeting? If you watch the official government gauge of prices in the economy, you would think so. Between March and April, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) dropped by 0.8 percent―that’s a decline of 9.1 percent at an annual rate! Even if we exclude food and energy, prices still fell at half that rate. And, both price measures already had begun to fall the previous month. Is this the new trend? Are we in the midst of a deflation? The short answer is no.

The pandemic is an enormous shock to both supply and demand (see our earlier post). The productive capacity of the economy is lower both now (with the lockdown) and in the medium term (with the need to make economic activity biologically safer). Similarly, demand is lower both temporarily while people stay at home and in the longer term as the propensity to save rises to enable people to pay off elevated debts and build precautionary buffers. Determining which of these shifts prevails is essential for policymakers. If the demand contraction dominates, then trend inflation will fall and policymakers will need to implement further expansionary policies. Conversely, if trend inflation rises (implying that the supply constraints prevail), then policymakers will eventually need to introduce restraint.

In this post, we discuss the difficulties of measuring inflation during a pandemic—when demand and supply both shift dramatically. Our conclusion is that some indices provide better high-frequency signals of the trend. Unsurprisingly, headline measures of inflation are especially poor. Yet, traditional measures of “core inflation” that exclude food and energy may be equally bad. Instead, we suggest focusing on the “trimmed mean,” a statistical construct that disregards all goods and services whose prices change by the largest amounts (either up or down). In recent months, the trimmed mean CPI shows suggest that inflation has edged lower, but remains between 1½ and 2 percent per year….

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COVID-19 Economic Downturn: What do cyclical norms suggest?

Business cycle downturns come in many forms. Some are big, others small. Some are long, others short. Some result from policy errors or euphoric booms, while others are the consequence of external events.

Nevertheless, downturns have some common features and regularities. Among those that have been reasonably stable over much of the past half century are the relationships among unemployment, activity and federal budget deficits. Using these, we explore the impact of the U.S. COVID-19 economic downturn that began last month.

To sum up, recent labor market developments already make clear that we are in the midst of the deepest recession since the 1930s. In fact, the coordinated shutdown of a large swath of the American economy has made this plunge more rapid than that of the Depression. Whether we are at the start of a second Depression depends greatly on how long we keep the economy in a state of suspended animation.

If the lockdown extends from weeks to months, the short-term pain will turn into long-term scarring. The longer it takes to reopen businesses safely, the more damage we will do to the many linkages and networks (including lender-borrower, supplier-user and employer-employee relationships) that make up the fabric of the economy. As the wave of bankruptcies grows, damage to the financial system will increase, as will the resulting harm to the economy’s productive capacity….

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Contagion: Bank Runs and COVID-19

There are currently more than 85,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in at least 60 countries. Yet, we know very little about this pathogen, except that everyone is worried. And, with the number of cases rising each day, intensifying concerns probably will lead many people to behave in ways that undermine economic activity. They will shy away from places where the virus can be transmitted. That means avoiding mass transit, schools, and workplaces.

Moreover, many people will stay away until they are confident that the disease is manageable. That confidence probably requires an effective treatment, a very low likelihood of infection, or both. Not surprisingly, many observers are reducing their projections for economic growth this year, while financial market participants anticipate easier monetary policy to cushion the shock.

The challenge of re-establishing public confidence that it is safe to venture out bears striking similarity to the one that authorities face in stemming a bank run. Our ability to identify and quarantine people infected with COVID-19 is analogous to our ability to recognize and isolate a bank bordering on insolvency. This and other similarities suggest that the means we use to control bank runs also may be useful in managing the economic consequences of an emerging pandemic like COVID-19….

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