Volatility

Russian Sanctions: Questions and Answers

This post is authored jointly with our friend and colleague, Professor Richard Berner, Co-Director of the NYU Stern Volatility and Risk Institute.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is altering global security and economic relationships. In this post, we focus on the financial and trade sanctions imposed on Russia. These sanctions are the most powerful and costly punishments imposed on a major economy at least since the Cold War. Their speed, breadth and coordinated global support appear unprecedented.

Not surprisingly, the impact is immediately visible. The damage to the Russian economy and financial system includes, but is not limited to, a plunge of the ruble (by about 40 percent versus the dollar over the past month amid heightened volatility); runs on domestic banks; a sharp hike in the central bank’s policy rate; imposition of capital controls; shutdown of the Russian stock market; collapse in the value of Russian companies traded on foreign stock exchanges; removal of Russian equities from global indexes; and the collapse of Russia’s sovereign credit rating to junk status.

The purpose of this post is to pose and provisionally answer a series of questions raised by this new sanctions regime.…

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GameStop: Some Preliminary Lessons

Volatility in the stock market is not new. But, even if one takes a broad perspective, the recent experience with GameStop is extraordinary. As we write, the story is far from over, with several U.S. stocks—like GameStop, AMC Entertainment and Express—still on something of a wild ride. The Securities and Exchange Commission seems poised to investigate. And, members of Congress are planning to hold hearings. We don’t have any particular insights into how or when this will end. That is, except to say that history teaches us that episodes like this typically end badly.

Since this is an unusual post, we begin with a very clear disclaimer: nothing in this blog should be construed either as investment advice or legal advice.

In our view, we can already draw three big lessons from the equity market events of the past week. The first is about how narratives and the limits to arbitrage can lead to unsustainable asset price booms. Second, short sellers are important for the efficiency of asset pricing and the allocation of capital. Moreover, with the ongoing rise of passive index investing, their potential role in keeping the U.S. equity market efficient will become more, not less, salient. Third, to keep the financial system safe and resilient, it is essential that clearing firms maintain sufficiently stringent margin and collateral requirements even if, on occasion, it limits a broker’s ability to implement trades for its clients….

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Stress tests lack COVID-scale stress

In recent months, the Federal Reserve acted aggressively to support nearly all parts of the U.S. economy. Unprecedented monetary policy actions, both in size and scope, served to maintain market function and the flow of credit. And, while we have misgivings about the Fed’s CARES Act-driven moves to support the nonfinancial sector, we applaud Chair Powell and his colleagues for their quick and decisive actions (see our previous posts here, here and here). This, together with fiscal policy support for individual households and small firms, has kept an awful situation from becoming far worse—at least for now.

But, the Fed’s responsibility extends beyond monetary policy to the regulatory and supervisory arenas: it is obliged to maintain the safety and soundness of the banking system (and, to some extent, of the broader financial system). On this score, and in stark contrast to its actions in 2009, the Board of Governors has come up significantly short. Without full disclosure of the latest stress test results, suspicions will linger about the ability of the largest banks to provide credit to healthy borrowers if the COVID recovery falters. (See our earlier post for details.)

In this post, we examine the results from the Fed’s 2020 assessment of bank capital adequacy published on June 25. Based on the COVID-related sensitivity analysis—for which individual results are unavailable—one-quarter of the 33 banks tested fall below the regulatory minimum in the worst of the three cases. The fact that we can only guess which banks those might be creates suspicion regarding many banks….

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An Open Letter to Randal K. Quarles, Federal Reserve Vice Chair for Supervision

Dear Vice Chair Quarles,

Nearly three years ago, we wrote an open letter congratulating you on your nomination as the first Vice Chair for Supervision on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In that letter, we highlight the central mission of ensuring the resilience and promoting the dynamism of the U.S. financial system.

Today we write to express our profound disappointment regarding the plans (expressed in your June 19 speech on “The Adaptability of Stress Testing“) to limit the disclosure of this year’s large-bank stress tests. In our view, failure to publish the individual bank results from the special COVID-19 related “sensitivity analysis” weakens the credibility and effectiveness of the Fed’s stress testing regime.

Consequently, we urge you to reverse course and to announce this week the individual bank sensitivity results, along with the aggregates. To put it bluntly, the point of a supervisory stress test is disclosure. Anything short of full transparency leaves potentially destabilizing questions unanswered.

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COVID-19 Stress Test

The COVID-19 shock is almost surely leading to a larger economic downturn than the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-09. However valuable, neither stress tests nor financial supervision in general has prepared us for a shock of this magnitude.

These developments leave us profoundly concerned that the global financial system lacks the resilience needed to weather what will clearly be a very violent storm. In our view, the most up-to-date information regarding the impact on the financial system of COVID-19 comes from NYU Stern Volatility Lab’s SRISK. By utilizing timely weekly market equity data, rather than less accurate and substantially delayed book-value information, SRISK enables us to gauge the aggregate shortfall of capital in the financial system during a crisis (defined as a 40 percent drop of the global equity market over the next six months). Analogous to a severe stress test, the idea behind SRISK is that an intermediary contributes to fragility to the extent that it is short of capital at the same time that there is a system-wide shortfall (see, for example, here). Just as a forest is more vulnerable to fire during a drought, so the financial system is more vulnerable to a large shock when there is a large aggregate capital shortfall.

In the remainder of this post, we highlight some recent SRISK developments and compare them to those during the 2007-09 crisis. We view these developments as a clear warning to regulators and supervisors that the COVID-19 shock meaningfully threatens financial stability across major jurisdictions….

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The Fed Goes to War: Part 1

Over the past two weeks, the Federal Reserve has resurrected many of the policy tools that took many months to develop during the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-09 and several years to refine during the post-crisis recovery. The Fed was then learning through trial and error how to serve as an effective lender of last resort (see Tucker) and how to deploy the “new monetary policy tools” that are now part of central banks’ standard weaponry.

The good news is that the Fed’s crisis management muscles remain strong. The bad news is that the challenges of the Corona War are unprecedented. Success will require extraordinary creativity and flexibility from every part of the government. As in any war, the central bank needs to find additional ways to support the government’s efforts to steady the economy. A key challenge is to do so in a manner that allows for a smooth return to “peacetime” policy practices when the war is past.

In this post, we review the rationale for reintroducing the resurrected policy tools, distinguishing between those intended to restore market function or substitute for private intermediation, and those meant to alter financial conditions to support aggregate demand….

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Protecting the Federal Reserve

Last week, President Trump tweeted his intention to nominate Dr. Judy Shelton to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In our view, Dr. Shelton fails to meet the criteria that we previously articulated for membership on the Board. We hope that the Senate will block her nomination.

Our opposition arises from four observations. First, Dr. Shelton’s approach to monetary policy appears to be partisan and opportunistic, posing a threat to Fed independence. Second, for many years, Dr. Shelton argued for replacing the Federal Reserve’s inflation-targeting regime with a gold standard, along with a global fixed-exchange rate regime. In our view, this too would seriously undermine the welfare of nearly all Americans. Third, should Dr. Shelton become a member of the Board, there is a chance that she could become its Chair following Chairman Powell’s term: making her Chair would seriously undermine Fed independence. Finally, Dr. Shelton has proposed eliminating the Fed’s key tool (in a world of abundant reserves) for controlling interest rates—the payment of interest on reserves….

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Assessing Housing Risk

Housing debt typically is on the short list of key sources of risk in modern financial systems and economies. The reasons are simple: there is plenty of it; it often sits on the balance sheets of leveraged intermediaries, creating a large common exposure; as collateralized debt, its value is sensitive to the fluctuations of housing prices (which are volatile and correlated with the business cycle), resulting in a large undiversifiable risk; and, changes in housing leverage (based on market value) influence the economy through their impact on both household spending and the financial system (see, for example, Mian and Sufi).

In this post, we discuss ways to assess housing risk—that is, the risk that house price declines could result (as they did in the financial crisis) in negative equity for many homeowners. Absent an income shock—say, from illness or job loss—negative equity need not lead to delinquency (let alone default), but it sharply raises that likelihood at the same time that it can depress spending. As it turns out, housing leverage by itself is not a terribly useful leading indicator: it can appear low merely because housing prices are unsustainably high, or high because housing prices are temporarily low. That alone provides a powerful argument for regular stress-testing of housing leverage. And, because housing markets tend to be highly localized—with substantial geographic differences in both the level and the volatility of prices—it is essential that testing be at the local level….

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Financial Crisis: The Endgame

Ten years ago this month, the run on Lehman Brothers kicked off the third and final phase of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. In two earlier posts (here and here), we describe the prior phases of the crisis. The first began on August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas suspended redemptions from three mutual funds invested in U.S. subprime debt, kicking off a global scramble for safe, liquid assets. And the second started seven months later when, in response to the March 2008 run on Bear Stearns, the Fed provided liquidity directly to nonbanks for the first time since the Great Depression, completing its crisis-driven evolution into an effective lender of last resort to solvent, but illiquid intermediaries.

The most intense period of the crisis began with the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. Credit dried up; not just uncollateralized lending, but short-term lending backed by investment-grade collateral as well. In mid-September, measures of financial stress spiked far above levels seen before or since (see here and here). And, the spillover to the real economy was rapid and dramatic, with the U.S. economy plunging that autumn at the fastest pace since quarterly reporting began in 1947.

In our view, three, interrelated policy responses proved critical in arresting the crisis and promoting recovery. First was the Fed’s aggressive monetary stimulus: after Lehman, within its mandate, the Fed did “whatever it took” to end the crisis. Second was the use of taxpayer resources—authorized by Congress—to recapitalize the U.S. financial system. And third, was the exceptional disclosure mechanism introduced by the Federal Reserve in early 2009—the first round of macroprudential stress tests known as the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)—that neutralized the worst fears about U.S. banks.

In this post, we begin with a bit of background, highlighting the aggregate capital shortfall of the U.S. financial system as the source of the crisis. We then turn to the policy response. Because we have discussed unconventional monetary policy in some detail in previous posts (here and here), our focus here is on the stress tests (combined with recapitalization) as a central means for restoring confidence in the financial system….

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Resolution Regimes for Central Clearing Parties

Clean water and electric power are essential for modern life. In the same way, the financial infrastructure is the foundation for our economic system. Most of us take all three of these, water, electricity and finance, for granted, assuming they will operate through thick and thin.

As engineers know well, a system’s resilience depends critically on the design of its infrastructure. Recently, we discussed the chaos created by the October 1987 stock market crash, noting the problems associated with the mechanisms for trading and clearing of derivatives. Here, we take off where that discussion left off and elaborate on the challenge of designing a safe derivatives trading system―safe, that is, in the sense that it does not contribute to systemic risk.

Today’s infrastructure is significantly different from that of 1987. In the aftermath of the 2007-09 financial crisis, authorities in the advanced economies committed to overhaul over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets. The goal is to replace bilateral OTC trading with a central clearing party (CCP) that is the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer....

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